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A THEORETICAL REVIEW OF THE MICROFINANCE ARGUMENT
This thesis makes a theoretical review of the microfinance argument, which claims
that  microfinance  would  be  accompanied  with  democratization  or  consolidation  of
democracy. This thesis firstly analyzes the theory of modern microfinance, especially its
propensity of converting borrowers into modern citizens. Secondly, this thesis analyzes
five major theories supporting the microfinance argument:  (a) modernization and eco-
nomic development, (b) economic fairness, (c) gender justice, (d) social capital, and (e)
civil society. In addition, this thesis reviews critical perspectives of these five theories
and makes a general discussion. Finally, this thesis concludes the reasonableness and lim-
itation of the microfinance argument.
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Introduction
Since the 1990s, microfinance has been highly appreciated by researchers, and well
adopted by international organizations,  non-profit  organizations (hereafter NPOs), and
governments, as a democracy-facilitating strategy.  Some researchers therefore asserted
that  the  collateral-free  and  group-based  microfinance  constitutes  a  vital  source  of
citizenship and democratic education for participatory and deliberative democracy; this
belief could be named the microfinance argument. The main objective of this thesis is to
make a theoretical review of this microfinance argument, to dialectically analyze why and
how this microfinance argument could possibly be sustainable, and finally to provide a
feasible framwork of theory for future empirical researchers of democratic development.
The Microfinance Argument
Grameen Bank (hereafter GB), a Nobel Peace Prize-winning microfinance institution
(hereafter MFI) and community development bank founded in Bangladesh, established a
successful mode of microloans to the most impoverished people having no reliable credit
history, trustworthy guarantor, nor valuable collateral.  By using peer pressure within a
small group composed of borrowers, GB created a workable mode of group lending to
ensure borrowers’ repayment and their in-group discipline, and founded the modern pro-
totype of microfinance.1
1 This thesis is aware of the fact that there are multiple modes of microfinance, and
Grameen  mode  is  only  one  of  them.  However,  considering  that  the  microfinance
movement should not be understood as just a member-based financial mutual-help
service, but rather an integration of financial inclusion and political socialization, this
thesis uses the term of microfinance in reference to GB or Grameen replications.
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Grameen-like modern microfinance could usually be identified as a self-help group:
It not only exhibits a high degree of coherence and strong common interests among mem-
bers but also has a democratic structure of organization and adopts democratic process to
deal with  the borrower group-relevant affairs  (Ledgerwood 2013, 105–6). It refers to  a
decentralized organizational structure,  a field-based delivery system, and a transparent
management culture  (Islam, Mohajan, and Datta 2012, 83–84), and provides members
and staff an efficient democratic training of self-governance.  Most MFIs adopt demo-
cratic processes to help members self-manage  (Dowla and Barua 2006, 28); borrowers
elect  their  group  leaders  and  representative  delegates  (Hassan  and  Renteria-Guerrero
1997, 1504–5; Rouf 2011a, 124). This democracy-training philosophy is broadly adopted
by Grameen replications around the world (Cheston and Kuhn 2002, 16–17; Counts and
Meriwether 2008, 9; Gibbons and Meehan 1999, 167; Hassan 2002, 213; Ledgerwood
2013, 85; Quinones and Seibel 2000, 426; Sanyal 2009, 537; Servon 1992, 149). Almost
all  group lending programs’ organizational  decisions  are  decided by borrowers  them-
selves through democratic procedures rather than by staff of NPOs (Hung 2006, 81).
The Democratic Mechanism of Microfinance
Some researchers assert that the collateral-free and group-based microfinance consti-
tutes a vital source of citizenship and democratic education for participatory and delibera-
tive democracy; this belief could be named the microfinance argument. It is believes that
microfinance  will  facilitate  democratization  or  consolidation  of democracy;  all  of  the
skills delivered by MFIs are necessary for borrowers to improve their sense of political
efficacy and democratic engagement, and increase the sense of commonality among the
marginalized poor (Rouf 2011a, 1). That is the reason why microfinance could be theoret-
ically related to democracy.
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Technically, most MFIs have not directly stepped into borrowers’ political participa-
tion in the formal democratic process. After all, MFIs’ major objective is to provide fi-
nancial services rather than political interests. However, through microfinance, borrowers
might  have gradually increased the investment  in their  own community  life  (Larance
1998, 29–30). Financially, microfinance empowers the poor to improve their own eco-
nomic conditions in an environmentally sound and sustainable manner (Auwal 1996, 28–
29). Likewise, microfinance also socially empowers the poor to be more aware of their
own situations and thus to be politically active.  As a result,  borrowers finally dare to
leave their houses to attend social gatherings and participate in political activities, acting
as “included” modern citizens  (Hassan 2002, 213). In this sense, microfinance substan-
tially facilitates not only the economic but also social and political empowerment of bor-
rowers through miscellaneous financial and welfare services.
In addition, microfinance is able to facilitate borrowers’ democratization of finance
by strengthening their financial literacy (Erturk et al. 2007, 559). In the modern world, fi-
nancial knowledge and management capabilities are more than necessary for global citi-
zens.  Higher economic knowledge and financial skills are usually related to more effi-
cient productivity, more free time, and therefore higher affordability and willingness to
participate in public life. Conversely, modern citizens with low financial skills and poorer
efficiency of labor might be excluded from the formal democratic process because they
need to spend more time on making a living and are less willing to participate in the
democratic process. Moreover, most modern public affairs involve complicated economic
issues. In that case, modern citizens need more economic and financial knowledge to help
them vote intelligently (Damon 1998, 625). With microfinance’s help, poor people have
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gradually been re-included into the financial and economic sector, which results in the
democratization of finance and therefore political democratization (Robinson 2005, 11).
Evidence for the Microfinance Argument
With microfinance’s help,  developing countries are  more likely to carry out their
constitutional democracy. Most developing countries only have nominal democracy and
an unwieldy state-bureaucracy. It is quite common for developing countries that most po-
litical power is monopolized by capitalists and religious elites. Even though they might
have democratic constitution and regular elections, most people in developing countries
have relatively little power  and are less capable of taking civil and political actions. In
that case, microfinance provides the poor a means of building up citizenship, directing
social changes, and establishing a voice in public affairs (White 1991, 15).
As a result, microfinance helped developing countries make great progress in the for-
mal democratic process. For example, the voter turnout in Bangladesh in 1996 broke the
past record due to increased female voters, which is commonly attributed to GB’s persis-
tent effort at providing borrowers’ democratic training (Yunus and Jolis 2003, 196). Like-
wise, the rate of democratic participation for Grameen members and their spouses was
100 percent in 1996. In the next year, more than 2,000 Grameen members got elected in
local elections  (Yunus 2002, para. 4–5). In Bangladesh’s local election of 2009, about
one-quarter of the total seats were won by Grameen members and their families; the num-
ber of female Grameen members serving as sub-district councilors increased from 1,572
in  1997 to  1,950 in  2003  (Rouf  2011a,  127).  Similar  cases  have  been  found by re-
searchers while observing Grameen replications around the world. As a study shows, the
longer  a  female  borrower  belongs  to  Bangladesh  Rural  Advancement  Committee
(BRAC), a microfinance NPO in Bangladesh, the more likely she will be politically em-
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powered (Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley 1996, 641). BRAC has a strong effect on female
borrowers’  participation  in  political  campaigns  and  public  protests:  more  and  more
BRAC members stand for local election as independent candidates  (Hashemi, Schuler,
and Riley 1996, 639). Likewise, over 89 percent of the members of Working Women’s
Forum (WWF), a women-centered  MFI in southern India,  had taken up civic  actions
against oppression in their neighborhoods  (Working Women’s Forum 2000, 22). In the
Philippines, female borrowers of the Opportunity Microfinance Bank zealously used their
leadership skills and confidence cultivated in the borrower group to run for local public
offices  (Bayulgen 2008,  537–38).  In Latin  America,  a  former leader  of  the  borrower
group of a local Honduran MFI actively used her experience and confidence to run for
mayor of a small  town. Members of the Trust Banks of AGAPE in Colombia helped
members  organize  protest  marches  for  community  development  (Cheston  and  Kuhn
2002, 24). In Russia, female borrowers of the Opportunity International Network (now
FORA Fund) organized themselves to campaign for democracy (Littlefield, Hashemi, and
Morduch 2003, 8). All of these examples suggest that microfinance might be able to con-
tribute to the effort of awakening the poor’s political awareness  (Hadenius and Uggla
1996, 1636) and facilitating their political empowerment and democratization. Though
democratic  transitions  hardly  occur  through a  “single”  or  “direct”  process  but  rather
through multiple paths defined by miscellaneous factors  (Barry 2012, 125–27), propo-
nents of the microfinance argument still see the impact of microfinance on democracy.
Theories Supporting the Microfinance Argument
This thesis focuses on five major theories which imply or support the microfinance
argument: (a) the democratic theory of modernization and economic development, (b) the
democratic theory of economic fairness, (c) the democratic theory of gender justice, (d)
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the democratic theory of social capital, and (e) the democratic theory of civil society. Al-
most all of these  five theories make their arguments via a two-step process: In the first
step, all of these theories argue that their factors, such as economic development, eco-
nomic fairness, gender justice, social capital, or civil society, are highly co-related (posi-
tively or negatively)  to democratization or consolidation of democracy. In the second
step, these theories argue that microfinance is highly co-related (positively or negatively)
to those variables as well. As a result, it would be accordingly inferred that microfinance
is highly  co-related to democratization or consolidation of democracy, i.e. the microfi-
nance argument.
According to the microfinance argument, microfinance is able to awaken the poor’s
political awareness, facilitate their political empowerment, and therefore is likely to be
associated with democratization or consolidation of democracy (See Barry 2012; Hade-
nius and Uggla 1996). However, none of these theories really explain the potential rela-
tionship or co-relationship between microfinance and democracy. Moreover, few, if any,
researchers mentioned theoretical inconsistencies among these five theories. For that rea-
son, the major objective of this thesis is to bridge this gap by making a comprehensive
theoretical review and analysis in order to obtain the “whole picture” of the microfinance
argument.
Methodology
By definition, this thesis is a literature-based theoretical analysis. On one hand, this
thesis adopts the method of Documentary Analysis (See Ritchie 2003) to deal with first-
hand sources and obtain relevant knowledge by reviewing various documentary materi-
als, such as MFI’s financial reports, internal statistical data, official guidelines, and policy
statements. On the other hand, this thesis uses the method of Between-Study Literature
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Analysis (Onwuegbuzie, Leech, and Collins 2012, 5–6) to deal with second-hand sources
and obtain relevant knowledge by scrutinizing miscellaneous academic works, such as
journal articles, monographs, technical reports, working papers, and meeting articles. By
putting all these sources and materials together into a theoretical framework, this thesis
theoretically analyzes the microfinance argument and makes a theoretical review.
Major Findings
In this thesis, the typical experience of modern MFI, including GB and Grameen
replications, is introduced. Based on that understanding, this thesis dialectically exams
the microfinance argument by analyzing most microfinance theories, democratic theories,
five major theories supporting the microfinance argument, and relevant critiques. It is not
intended by this thesis to demonstrate the causal relationship between microfinance and
democracy; this thesis only focuses on theoretically explaining the reason why co-rela-
tionship might exist between these two variables. By reviewing and analyzing the sup-
porting theories of the microfinance argument and relevant critiques, this thesis clarifies
this argument’s reasonability and the plausibility. In addition, by linking various indirect
explanations of the microfinance argument to a more comprehensive theoretical under-
standing, this thesis bridges the theoretical gap and rephrases the microfinance argument.
It is asserted by this thesis that the microfinance argument is theoretically reasonable, al-
though it might face some fierce critiques or exceptional cases. However, the impact of
microfinance on democratization or consolidation of democracy is relatively indirect and
chronic, and it would be by nature difficult for researchers to precisely measure its effect.
With this caveat and the contribution of this thesis, future researchers of democratic de-
velopment, will have more solid ground to evaluate the democratic contribution of micro-
finance while considering its political benefits.
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Structure of This Thesis
This thesis consists of five parts: The first part introduces the philosophy and theories
of modern MFI, especially GB and Grameen replications around the world in Chapter 1.
The second part reviews the most acceptable definitions of democracy and their theoreti-
cal pillars in Chapter 2. Third part analyzes  five major theories supporting the microfi-
nance argument in Chapters 3 and 4. The fourth part introduces theoretical critiques of
the five major theories supporting the microfinance argument in Chapter 5, and makes a
general discussion of the microfinance argument in Chapter 6. Finally, the Conclusion re-
iterates the major findings of this thesis and rephrases the microfinance argument into a
more accurate and exquisite version.
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1. Microfinance as a Civil Society Organization:
From Borrower Members to Citizens
In this chapter, a brief history is introduced about the Grameen mode of modern mi-
crofinance and how it developed. This chapter, in addition, discusses how the Grameen
mode of microfinance works, analyzes its ideas and throeies, and unveils its core mission
of modernization and democratic civilization. Due to this cause of democratization, mi-
crofinance is accordingly expected to forerun the democratic reform or deepen the demo-
cratic development while providing a financial  outlet  for the poor in most developing
countries.
Grameen Bank: The Prototype of Modern Microfinance
The prototype of the modern MFI was created by GB. It revised the old self-help/mu-
tual-help group lending system and introduced pro-capitalistic internal incentives to bor-
rowers so that a new self-sustainable and replicable mode of microfinance was made. In
addition, based on the spirit of self-employment, being self-sustaining, and self-reliance,
GB also created a new strategy of poverty alleviation. Today, GB has 8.6 million mem-
bers and 2,567 branches all around the world, and has cumulatively disbursed USD 15.08
billion since its inception (See Grameen Bank 2014). Its branches, cooperative partners,
and inspired replications have spread from Bangladesh to the whole world.
The classical mode of GB (Grameen Classic, hereafter G1) was characterized by its
nature of group lending. By group lending,  GB successfully provided a loan service to
those who have no (or only bad) credit history, no guarantor, or no collateral or warranty.
The group lending system organized borrowers as a small group and utilized peer pres-
sure as the social collateral to ensure borrowers’ punctual repayment. This joint liability
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system relied on social sanction (Armendáriz 1999, 81), from refusal of re-finance to os-
tracism (Ito 2003, 325) or even the use of physical force by peers (Armendáriz and Mor-
duch 2000, 404). However, after its 24 years of practice (See Yunus 2013), GB adopted a
new system, Grameen II (hereafter G2), in order to deal with the precariousness of the
poor more flexibly (Dowla and Barua 2006, 93). It discarded the negative pressure of so-
cial sanctions in the group lending system and tried to induce borrowers’ internal initia-
tiveness. By fulfilling borrowers’ various needs and invoking their spontaneous and self-
interested incentive for higher income, G2 made borrowers more active in their microen-
terprise so that they would be more willing to repay their installments on time in order to
retain their opportunities of refinancing. As a result, GB made its recovery rate of bad
debt from zero-point-one-two percent in 1999 to 12.95 percent in 2005  (See Grameen
Bank  2013f).  This  borrower-oriented  strategy  of  microfinance  is  well  adopted  by
Grameen replications  around the world,  especially  the ghetto areas  in  well-developed
countries. Though still having different policies and regulations, most Grameen replica-
tions share similar spirits and essential values with GB: (a) to help borrowers accumulate
and enlarge their capital; (b) to consolidate borrowers’ mutual trust and in-group identity;
(c) to provide borrowers and their families financial benefits and mutual welfare as incen-
tives; and (d) to develop borrowers’ out-group engagement.
Enlarging and Accumulating Borrowers’ Capitals
The main goal of microfinance is to help borrowers enlarge and accumulate their
capitals, including financial capital and social capital. In order to bring borrowers positive
cash flow, MFIs provide them financial capital and help them invest it into productive
businesses, mostly microenterprises. With the help of positive cash flow, borrowers are
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able to escape from double oppression, the predicament mutually worsened by undercapi-
talization and poverty. On the contrary, borrowers’ financial capital and social capital mu-
tually improve each other. In order to start this beneficial cycle of dual capital, MFIs need
to be convinced by borrowers’ creditworthiness in order to lower MFIs’ credit risk (Hung
2002, 238). In the group lending system, borrowers must join a voluntary borrower group
in order to obtain their loan. This group is typically composed of five persons who share
similar economic strengths and social characteristics (Rahman 1996, 211). The group size
is intentionally designed to be small  (Mondal and Tune 1993, 226); as a study shows,
members of small groups will cooperate more than will members of large groups (See J.
A. Wagner 1995). All group members have the compulsory duty to attend weekly meet-
ings and make repayments regularly (S. R. Khandker, Khalily, and Khan 1995, 11). In ad-
dition,  they  govern themselves  by self-electing  leaders  and making decisions  through
democratic processes. Every five to eight groups are tied together as a center, and demo-
cratic procedures are adopted by the whole Grameen hierarchy to self-organize  (Dowla
and Barua 2006, 156; Hassan 2002, 230).
For MFIs, the key to group lending is the peer or social pressures, which act as bor-
rowers’ social collateral: borrowers  use their reputation and trustworthiness to take the
place of the traditional physical or financial collateral (van Bastelaer 2000, 1). Since bor-
rower groups are often composed of self-selected members who already have social con-
nections to each other, borrowers can easily screen out risky members or those untrust-
worthy to repay loans, which covers the economic cost of negligence. As a study shows,
identifiability in a social group is positively co-related with cooperation of members (J.
A. Wagner 1995, 167). With the help of social pressure, borrowers do keep a sharp eye on
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transaction costs involved in enforcing payment (van den Brink and Chavas 1997, 752–
53).  Once borrowers feel confident in trusting others, they will feel confident trusting
themselves through other borrowers’ trust. Through the mechanism that only those trust-
worthy ones are allowed to obtain new debts and bigger loans, borrowers are willing to
voluntarily discipline themselves in order to demonstrate their trustworthiness  (Karlan,
Harigaya, and Nadel 2009, 237).
Once borrowers are familiar with the discipline and the group life, they will easily
turn their social capital into financial capital and reproduce more social capital in turn.
Since social trust and social pressure are the only things the poor can count on in order to
be self-reliant, one of the major missions of MFIs is undoubtedly to strengthen the trust-
worthiness of borrowers. MFIs utilize peer pressure and joint liability of solidarity groups
as a special type of risk management  (Quinones and Seibel 2000, 425).  There are three
levels of social pressure in the microfinance system: First, the grass-roots group chairper-
son or MFI staff personally visit those borrowers who have missed regular meetings (and
repayments).  In addition,  members publicly scold those borrowers who fall  behind in
their own repayments (Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley 1996, 649). Finally, by hosting regu-
lar meetings and workshops, MFIs invite  members to audit all transactions. This trans-
parency of operation helps MFIs win borrowers’ trust. In return, MFIs can use their credi-
bility and power to promote services such as education of literacy, of productive skills,
and of sanitary knowledge for the modern life of members.
Consolidating In-Group Identity
In order to maximize members’ social capital, most MFIs prefer to invest their re-
sources in the most vulnerable and neediest targets in society, because they are usually
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those who are most willing to preserve their trustworthiness as well. While some MFIs,
such as the Landless People’s Development Fund, focus on the proletariat or the landless
in society, others target women, minorities, immigrants, and the disabled, or even some
more moderate-income individuals with job-skills and experience (Keating, Rasmussen,
and Rishi 2010, 158–59).  MFIs usually use socio-economic features such as sources of
income, demography, occupational pattern, land-ownership, market-accessibility, or liter-
acy as the tool of identifying the neediest group. In some extreme cases, MFI’s effective
targeting even yields the impression that participation in microfinance  makes the poor
poorer (Morduch 1999a, 1599).
Due to their occupational patterns, which easily form groups, poor women are usu-
ally MFIs’ best target (Rahman 1996, 211). For four reasons, MFIs usually prefer female
members: The first reason refers to the fact of gender inequality. Females are usually the
poorest or the most suffering group in society, which makes them the “worst” borrowers
for traditional financial agencies, but those who need the financial capital most and those
who are most willing to prove their trustworthiness. The second reason is  related to the
nature of female’s reliability. Female members usually attend regular meetings more fre-
quently and repay their installments more steadily than males (See Armendáriz and Mor-
duch 2000, 417; S. R. Khandker 2012, 21; S. R. Khandker, Khalily, and Khan 1995, 18).
The third reason refers to the gender-based pattern of loan utilization. While male bor-
rowers tend to invest in “big” projects, most female borrowers utilized their loans on
pragmatic  plans  in  the  primary  economic  sector  (Hossain  1988,  49–50),  which  have
lower risks and are relatively easy for new, self-employed microentrepreneurs. The final
reason refers to the gender difference of social essence. A female-based group is easier to
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mobilize and requires less effort to consolidate. In contrast, male members are less will-
ing to trade off their obeisance to the collective norms against the opportunity of microfi-
nance, especially when most males still have some socio-economic edge over females
(See Hossain 1988, 62 table 33). As a result, most MFIs focus on female borrowers by
providing the means for productive self-employment and inviting them to re-participate
in the “mainstream” economic and political  processes of society  (See United Nations
2006).
In order to make borrowers familiar with discipline codes of conduct and some other
necessary  modern  knowledge,  GB  outlined  the  “16  Decisions”  (See  Grameen  Bank
2013a),  which  embody  GB’s  overall  objective  of  social  development  (United  States
Agency for International Development 1995, para. 1). Likewise, other MFIs also use sim-
ilar  discipline  codes  to  educate  members  (See  Develtere  and  Huybrechts  2002,  3;
Shahidur R. Khandker 1998, 26–27 table 2.3). Through discipline codes, MFIs raise bor-
rowers’ conscientiousness and knowledge, consolidate their  in-group identity, improve
their civic engagement, forge their sense of citizenship, and, eventually, strengthen their
commitment to MFIs (Rahman and Samad 1993, 182).
In order to emancipate borrowers’ productivity, MFIs utilize rituals to “help” members
become familiar with their norms. For example, Grameen members must salute each other
and sit  on the floor in specific rows at regular meetings  (Hashemi,  Schuler, and Riley
1996, 649). In addition, GB asks members to collectively recite the “16 Decisions” before
every regular meeting or workshop begins  (See Ferraro 2000). Sometimes it even asks
members to parade and do physical drills while chanting the discipline codes  (Hossain
1988, 27). Through all these rituals, MFIs intentionally impose the discipline codes upon
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members. After all, “Credit without strict discipline is nothing but charity. Charity does
not help overcome poverty; it  can only offer temporary relief”  (Yunus 1998, 55).  All
these ritualized discipline codes create a new way of thinking, fighting against the tradi-
tional and conservative values and gender roles (Develtere and Huybrechts 2005, 184).
Through group lending, MFIs allow  borrowers to be their own guarantors  (Yunus
2008, para. 7). What MFIs count on is the trust between MFIs and borrowers, and more
importantly, the trust among all borrowers. Trust not only guarantees borrowers’ repay-
ment but also consolidates members. This social collateral shapes a Durkheimian relation
of “non-contractual elements of contract” (Woolcock 1998a, 156) between MFIs and bor-
rowers. Likewise, trust and social connections among members have a significant effect
that  lowers  the cost  of  information-gathering.  Since  both cultural  similarity  and geo-
graphic concentration can lead to improved group lending outcomes  (Karlan 2007, 78–
79), as an observation in Peru shows, MFIs also need to invest resources in building a
better communication network among borrowers to encourage them to be socially inter-
connected.  For that reason, most MFIs prefer to focus on homogeneous members who
have already shared some level of social connections and bindings.
However, as a laboratory experiment shows, it is far less than enough to make the
peer monitoring mechanism work well in the case that MFIs only rely on strong social
ties among borrowers  (Cason, Gangadharan, and Maitra 2012, 207).  Since the cost of
peer monitoring could be high while facing the household-based atomistic nature of rural
economies, what MFIs need is to build adequate infrastructure among borrowers in order
to de-atomize borrowers, i.e. a strong bonding among members. Once borrowers are psy-
chologically and materially connected or interdependent through emotional bonds, tradi-
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tions, and social groups, their preferences of decision-making will be more likely to be
based on loyalties and trust (Stone 2002, 10). Due to that reason, modern MFIs use most
of their resources to consolidate borrowers in order to forge a strong in-group identity and
feeling of belonging.
Providing Mutual Benefit and Welfare as Incentives
Due to the dependence on inner coherence of borrowers’ social capital, G1 suffered
an unstable mechanism that kept members in the microfinance system. After 1995, more
and more borrowers dropped out of membership because their microenterprise did not
work out as expected. The tremendous flood that hit Bangladesh in 1998 acted as the last
straw; though GB provided borrowers fresh interest-free loans to maintain their living
conditions and rebuild their homes, many of them still felt burdened by the accumulated
loans, and chose to avoid regular meetings or cut their contact with other group members.
As a result, GB made up its mind to adopt the G2 system. It not only readjusted the struc-
ture of its internal capital flow, but also strengthened its role as a provider of mutual wel-
fare services to members. With the help of various beneficial services, MFIs provide bor-
rowers a  motivation to voluntarily stay in the microfinance system (Rahman and Islam
1993, 57–59). As a result,  GB successfully solved its crisis of internal trust brought by
natural disasters and reshaped the role of MFI.
Group Fund. Before 2000, the G1 system asked borrowers to deposit a weekly con-
tribution and an extra five percent of their loan amount into a group account called the
Group Fund, which was rewarded with interest at eight-point-five percent annually (Hos-
sain 1988, 27) and acted as a form of insurance  (Hassan and Renteria-Guerrero 1997,
1500). This account was managed by the  borrower group itself consensually for emer-
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gency use. In addition, with all group members’ consent, a borrower once able to make an
extra interest-free loan from the Group Fund if in needy circumstances (Dowla and Alam-
gir 2003, 973), although they still needed to deposit an extra five percent of this new loan
amount into the Group Fund  (S. R. Khandker, Khalily, and Khan 1995, 30). However,
this Group Fund brought borrowers a  heavy burden of interest and its compulsoriness
made  borrowers  privately  call  it  a  “group tax”  (Dowla  and Barua  2006,  122).  Even
worse, borrowers were not entitled to claim their share of this Group Fund when they
chose to leave the microfinance system (Hossain 1988, 26).
Compulsory Savings. GB under the G1 system reduced the required contribution for
the Group Fund after 1991 and canceled the whole Group Fund system under the G2 sys-
tem; however, GB still asks borrowers to deposit five percent as the “Compulsory Sav-
ings”  (Hossain and Diaz 1997, 93). This new extra compulsory savings is comprise of
two different savings accounts, both of them under borrowers’ own names. Two-point-
five percent of the savings is deposited in a personal savings account, opened at the be-
ginning of the membership for the required weekly deposit by the borrower, while the
other  two-point-five  percent  is  deposited  in  a  special  savings  account  (Rutherford,
Maniruzzaman, and Sinha 2004, 9–10). Borrowers can withdraw any amount from the
personal savings account at any time but cannot withdraw the special savings account un-
til (a) maintaining the membership for more than three years, (b) having no “bridge loan”
or “flexible loan” (Dowla and Barua 2006, 81–82), and (c) the balance of the special sav-
ings account meets the minimum requirement for more than three years  (Yunus 2013,
para. 21).
17
The idea of compulsory savings is well-adopted by Grameen replications around the
world  (See Counts and Meriwether 2008, 7; Dowla and Alamgir 2003, 973; Quinones
and Seibel  2000,  426).  Many MFIs  use members’ compulsory  savings  as  an  internal
source of funding to keep their  resource-mobilization and reduce their dependence on
government  funding,  external  donor,  or  commercial  resources  (Quinones  and  Seibel
2000, 425). However, those borrowers who lack determination or the discipline to accu-
mulate  savings may view mandatory savings merely as an additional  burden  (Karlan,
Harigaya, and Nadel 2009, 246). For that reason, MFIs need to enhance the education of
borrowers through the discipline codes or lectures. Nevertheless, some MFIs still need to
find extra financial sources to subsidize borrowers in order to increase borrowers’ incen-
tive to support the compulsory savings system.
Compulsory  Pension. Under  the  G2 system,  every  borrower  who has  a  big  loan
(more than BDT 8,000) must contribute a monthly deposit as their pension, while it is op-
tional if the loan amount is small (Rutherford, Maniruzzaman, and Sinha 2004, 14). Bor-
rowers can choose different plans for the pension, under different conditions of interest
reward (Counts and Meriwether 2008, 2). In each case, borrowers will receive a doubled
pension fund if they join this pension system for 10 years  (Rutherford, Maniruzzaman,
and Sinha 2004, 14). However, if borrowers delay their deposit to the pension plan for
more than four months, the pension account will turn into a regular savings account with
a reduced interest rate of eight-point-five percent automatically (Dowla and Barua 2006,
73).
Emergency Fund and Life Insurance. The new pension plan introduced by the G2
system was inspired by G1’s existing Emergency Fund; borrowers were obliged to de-
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posit a sum equivalent to 25 percent of their loan amount as the Emergency Fund under
the G1 system (Rahman 1996, 197), which was deposited in a special account and acted
as  insurance  for  member’s  funeral  and  burial  expenses,  death  pension,  disability  al-
lowance, or other unforeseen events  (Hossain 1988, 27). It also offered protection for
debts or liability when a member died or lost the business for force majeure (Hassan and
Renteria-Guerrero 1997, 1500). However, just like the Group Fund, the Emergency Fund
became burdensome for many borrowers.  GB therefore reduced the requirement for the
contributions  to  the Emergency Fund after  1991  (S.  R. Khandker, Khalily, and Khan
1995, 11) and cancelled the whole Emergency Fund system in 1992 (Wahid 1993, 34).
Under the G2 system, the Emergency Fund evolved into the Special Savings Fund, acting
as a combination of default insurance and life insurance. With the help of the Special
Savings Fund, borrowers will have whole coverage for their outstanding loans with the
help of insurance. In addition, their families will be able to obtain the amount that was
deposited if the borrower dies  (Dowla and Barua 2006, 98). The Special Savings Fund
even pays for borrower’s funeral and burial expenses. The mandatory insurance is mutu-
ally productive for both MFIs and borrowers. On one hand, it is profitable for MFIs due
to its nature of ensuring broad participation (which enables insurers to reach economies
of scale) and of limiting the effect of adverse selection (which increases the accuracy of
predicting insurers’ future claims). On the other hand, mandatory insurance has become
the reward provided by MFIs to borrowers as a loyalty incentive (Churchill 2013, 255–
56).
Flexible Credit Service. Under the G2 system,  GB started more flexible and bor-
rower-oriented financial services. It adopted a new loan ceiling policy, which allows bor-
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rowers having better repayment history to obtain bigger loans. Likewise, GB, under the
G2 system, also set a flexible criterion of installment based on the nature and the environ-
ment of borrowers’ microenterprises  (Dowla and Barua 2006, 75). In addition,  GB has
adopted a new early-warning system. During their own probation period (first six months
or 26 weeks since joining the microfinance system), borrowers can only obtain a small
loans, which exactly equals to the amount of what has already been paid by the borrower.
After the probation period, borrowers will be able to obtain bigger loans  (Dowla and
Barua 2006, 93–94). Furthermore, GB under the G2 system provides the “flexible loan”
service, which allows borrowers to temporarily reduce their installment in case they have
trouble repaying the debt during the “grace period” of six months or 26 weeks in each of
their loan cycle (Dowla and Barua 2006, 75–76).
Housing loans. After the devastating floods of 1987 and 1988, GB under the G2 sys-
tem reshaped its housing loan services in order to respond to the crisis caused by the se-
ries of natural disasters (Dowla and Barua 2006, 25; Rahman and Hasnat 1993, 87–88).
Since its inception, GB has always encouraged borrowers to improve their housing condi-
tions, maintain sanitation status, and keep a healthy and productive living environment by
instilling its discipline codes in members’ minds. As observations show, GB’s housing
loans significantly improved borrowers’ living conditions; they had larger living space
and better resistance to natural disasters (Hassan and Renteria-Guerrero 1997, 1512–13;
Hassan 2002, 238–39; Hossain 1988, 69).  Psychologically, housing loan borrowers felt
more joyful and happy and had revitalized self-dignity and self-confidence (Rahman and
Hasnat 1993, 77). As a result, housing loans have positive impacts on Grameen borrow-
ers’ total working hours (Hassan and Renteria-Guerrero 1997, 1514), their willingness to
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seek a secondary source of income (Rahman and Hasnat 1993, 92), and, therefore, their
repayment capability.
Though housing loan services are commonly provided by MFIs in various forms, the
profits from this kind of business is actually limited. For example, GB earned signifi-
cantly less income from its housing loan business, compared with its normal loan busi-
ness (Hossain 1988, 72). This suggests that the reason why MFIs keep providing housing
loan services is not for their short-term profit from the income of interest but for their
long-term benefit through enhancing borrowers’ identity of membership and commitment
to MFIs, incentive of profit, living conditions, productivity, and repayment capability.
Public Health. Other than hosting public health lectures during borrowers’ regular
meetings (See Dunford 2001, 15), many MFIs set up health care centers to serve borrow-
ers and field-level staff, in order to enhance their health and productivity. For example,
GB has Kalyan (meaning “well-being”), who invests in health-related enterprises and ac-
tivities (Morduch 1999b, 243) and provide primary health care services and micro health
insurance services. Likewise, BRAC also provides borrowers and staff primary health
care services and micro health insurance  (Schurmann and Johnston 2009, 523). Due to
their limited resources, some smaller MFIs choose to cooperate with large commercial in-
surance companies as third-party service providers (Ledgerwood 2013, 195).
All of these health-relevant services provided by MFIs help borrowers enhance their
living conditions and productivity (M. M. Pitt and Khandker 1998, 986; M. M. Pitt et al.
2003, 111). In addition, MFIs’ health services significantly increased their consumption
habit. Borrowers expended a higher portion of resources on health care (Rahman, Wahid,
and Islam 1993, 123). They also increased their demand for formal health care services,
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which indirectly promoted investment in public health in rural areas  (Dowla and Barua
2006, 45–46). All in all, the health services provided by MFIs significantly reduce bor-
rowers’ likelihood of falling under the poverty line and act as an informal mechanism of
risk insurance (Biosca, Lenton, and Mosley 2011, 5, 17).
Members as Shareholders. The ultimate means of MFIs to attract borrowers to stay in
the system is extending its ownership to members. GB, under the G2 system, allows bor-
rowers to use their deposit in the special savings account to purchase its shares. GB did
not pay shareholders dividends until 2007  (Grameen Bank 2013c, para. 1), but it now
provides dividends as reward interest into member shareholders’ accounts. For example,
it declared 100 percent for the year 2006 and declared 30 percent as cash dividends for
the year 2010  (Grameen Bank 2013b, para. 13). In 2010, about 96.71 percent of GB’s
shares were owned by borrowers  (Grameen Bank 2013e, para. 4). It is also found that
many MFIs in developing countries allow borrowers to purchase their shares (See Nelson
2013, 167).
The idea of “member-ownership” is one of the best solutions for establishing a long-
term cooperation between MFIs and borrowers. In most developing countries, the  gov-
ernment’s enforcement of loan contracts is neither binding nor easily enforceable. Politi-
cians or officials often write off small loans or remit interest payments of poor people in
order to win their political support. As a result, it creates or promotes a prevalent culture
of default among common people (Shahidur R. Khandker 1998, 85), which suggests that
government-owned or -funded microfinance programs can hardly build their credibility
and that client borrowers can hardly subject their short-term self-interests to the mutual
well-being. Conversely, MFIs whose shareholders are mostly borrowers tend to pursue
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long-term strategic interest. Due to their edge of trust between MFIs and borrowers and
mutually among borrowers, such MFIs need not put their capital at unnecessary risk and
are less likely to engage in risky activities to pursue short-term profit maximization (C.
Wagner 2012, 189). Furthermore, since such MFIs’ non-public ownership structure re-
duces their dependence on capital markets, they usually have lower national and interna-
tional market exposure, and lower operational and financial leverage (Krauss and Walter
2009, 107–8). As a result, due to their strong ownership structure, such MFIs could be
more resistant to fluctuation and recession (Jansson 2001, 7). In addition, due to having a
clear ownership structure, a joint-stock MFI is likely to attract private capital, which is
essential  to  increase  a  MFI’s outreach in  developing  countries  that  lack  financial  re-
sources  (ECSSD Microfinance Team 2004, 16–17).  It is well-observed  that MFI’s out-
reach to the poor and its viability are not only compatible but also are mutually reinforc-
ing  (Seibel and Torres 1999, 124).  In order to serve difficult-to-reach borrowers, MFIs
need to maintain regular contact and build a solid interconnection with borrowers (Parker
and Nagarajan 2000, 3). In this sense, inviting borrowers to be the shareholders is one of
the best ways to establish the mutual trust between MFIs and borrowers.
Developing Institutional Engagement
In order to guarantee borrowers’ repayments, MFIs need not only the  consolidated
social capital among borrowers, nor the internal incentives induced by benefits and wel-
fare  services,  but  also  a  more  favorable  external  environment.  As  the  United  States
Agency for International Development suggested, MFIs need a pro-capitalist  and pro-
democratic external environment to facilitate their development (See Nagarajan and Mc-
Nulty 2004); pro-capitalist and pro-democratic ideas must take root in borrowers’ minds,
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in order to thoroughly change their  weltanshauung,  or worldview, and to convert them
into law-abiding and cooperative modern citizens.
MFIs use various resources to encourage borrowers to recognize the existing capital-
ist regime and honor the rules in order to flourish in it. In return, the trust in the institu-
tions from borrowers helps MFIs maintain the whole microfinance system. Once borrow-
ers understand and are willing to pursue their prosperity by following market rules, they
will see the others as equal transactors in the market. Meanwhile, once having knowledge
and skills to participate in the democratic process of political affairs, they will know how
to protect their legal rights; more importantly, they will know how to use the law and le-
gal institutions to protect their interests and pursue profits.
Educational Loans. Most MFIs emphasize education of borrowers. They usually use
regular meetings or workshops to deliver necessary knowledge or skills training. In re-
turn, this  empowerment-training provided by MFIs increases their impact on borrowers
by improving members’ mobility and ability to make economic decisions. For example,
as an observation of MFIs in Peru shows, although most borrowers complained those
longer and longer regular meetings which are caused by the extra training courses MFIs
provided,  they  still  choose to  stay  in  the  microfinance  system because  they did gain
greater knowledge and more productive skills of managing their microenterprise from
their microfinance participation; the increased length of regular meetings was outweighed
by the perceived benefit of the training courses provided by MFIs (Karlan, Harigaya, and
Nadel 2009, 235).
Other than that, most MFIs provide various financial resources for the education of
borrowers’ children. Financial support of education is commonly used as the vehicle of
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enhancing group identity, enforcing moral or social obligations, and facilitating the emer-
gence of social trust (Portes 1998, 9). Likewise, almost every MFI’s discipline codes em-
phasize the importance of children’s education and their capacity to pursue further educa-
tion (See Grameen Bank 2013a, para. 7; M. M. Pitt and Khandker 1998, 26–27 table 2.3).
For example, GB set up a compulsory Children’s Welfare Fund for the education of bor-
rowers’ children, which maintains local primary schools (MacIsaac and Wahid 1993, 198)
and supports children’s involvement in income earning projects (S. R. Khandker, Khalily,
and Khan 1995, 30) or productive auxiliary skills  (Hossain 1993, 15). In addition,  GB
also set up a grant program for high-school students of members2 since 1999 (Dowla and
Barua 2006, chap. 7; Yunus 2013, para. 47) and a higher education loan program since
1997 (Grameen Bank 2013d, para. 9). Meanwhile, GB provided flexible loans for the pri-
mary or secondary education of borrowers’ children (Ledgerwood and Earne 2013, 224).
Up to 2009, GB issued loans for higher education of about USD 36.95 million and helped
50,177 students obtain their post-secondary degrees (Grameen Bank 2013d, para. 4).
As a result, as an observation shows, microloan borrowers’ children were more likely
to go to school and their drop-out rates were much lower (Dowla and Barua 2006, 222;
Littlefield, Hashemi, and Morduch 2003, 4; Shahidur R. Khandker 1998, 49); students in
microloan borrowers’ families usually performed better than their counterparts  (Little-
field, Hashemi, and Morduch 2003, 6). MFIs’ emphasis on education has changed bor-
rowers’ ideas and life. More and more borrowers see education as an asset rather than an
unnecessary expenditure; a well-educated young woman could have not only a better in-
come-earning job but also a more economically “advantageous” husband (S. Shetty 2010,
2 GB intentionally preserves half of the opportunity for the grant for girls exclusively
and opens the rest half to both girls and boys.
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377). With microfinance’s help, borrowers gradually encourage children to develop their
education and be better citizens; most second generation of borrowers now have the skills
to protest on the street, lobby for their own interests, and are capable of taking action for
the rights of the marginalized poor (Rouf 2011b, 23).
Group Lending Is Not a P  anacea. Joint liability or group lending is just one mecha-
nism driving the performance of loan repayment, although it could be important, espe-
cially in early stages and for poorer clients (Armendáriz and Morduch 2000, 416). How-
ever, group lending does not necessarily work all the time (See Armendáriz and Morduch
2000, 418; Vinelli 2002, 156). One of the prerequisites of group lending is a powerful en-
vironment full of the force of social sanction (See Karlan 2007), which deeply relies on a
static social  network and asks no change of social  structure.  Once social  connections
shift, the mechanism of group lending will malfunction (Armendáriz and Morduch 2000,
416). Joint liability loans can only encourage borrowers’ mutual insurance at the cost of
excessive punishment in equilibrium. A good group lending system needs an efficient
mechanism of cross-reporting among borrowers, which is costly to establish and main-
tain, in order to reduce the inequality of information about borrowers’ repayment capacity
(Rai and Sjöström 2004, 217). As a matter of fact, due to the excessiveness of the cost of
joint liability, only few MFIs can fully cover the cost of group lending (Morduch 1999c,
246), and borrowers will only stay in the microfinance system while having no alternative
options (Vigenina and Kritikos 2004, 174). As some empirical researchers suggested, the
group lending model might be less suitable to relatively industrialized areas (Armendáriz
and Morduch 2000, 403), because the cost of cross-reporting is higher and borrowers
have more alternatives.
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As empirical studies show, internal incentives of borrowers alone are not sufficient to
sustain a microfinance system (Pickering and Mushinski 2001, 460). It calls for an insti-
tutional force providing the public goods in order to impute the cost of cross-reporting. If
borrowers can honor the institution itself, both individual loans and joint liability loans
deliver the efficient outcome, and vice versa, since the institution itself elicits a revelation
of  truthful  information  from  borrowers  through  cross-reporting  schemes  (Rai  and
Sjöström n.d., 2). That is, a well-functional external environment in favor of the mutual
trust is vital for MFIs’ success. Peer pressure and group lending can only work in MFIs’
early stage. Eventually, MFIs need to lead borrowers to the external regimes, which pro-
vide a superordinate value system or ideology to constrain single member’s self-inter-
ested reasoning. In other words, the key to a MFI’s success is to transform borrowers into
modern citizens, while acting as part of the engineering of socio-economic inclusion.
Socio-Economic Inclusion. Education, one of the most focuses of the MFIs’ welfare
services, is commonly seen as a driver of economic recovery and social inclusion. For
most welfare states, education should enable all citizens to acquire quality knowledge,
skills, and competences needed for employment, inclusion, active citizenship, and per-
sonal fulfillment  (European Commission n.d., para. 1). However,  welfare services like
education, in most developing countries, were primarily provided by the government or
international NPOs, which might be biased by intentional political activism and elites’
prejudices, and therefore reflect and reinforce existing social inequalities  (Davis 2001,
93; Rahman and Razzaque 2000, 19). Within these vertical networks of “clientalism,” in-
dividuals tend to devote their loyalty to welfare service providers rather than to their own
social groups, which weakens the horizontal class solidarity among the poor (Goetz and
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Gupta 1996, 86). In this sense, microfinance can help fight against social exclusion; the
economic integration might result in the poor’s social empowerment and increase of self-
esteem and dignity (Bayulgen 2008, 531); the credit provided by MFIs becomes a means,
rather than an end, of self-fulfillment (Velasco and Marconi 2004, 525).
Furthermore, MFIs need a more socially inclusive membership to enhance the inter-
nal strength of peer pressure (Schurmann and Johnston 2009, 521–22).  For that reason,
since 2000, GB, under the G2 system, started to accept struggling members, who are the
poorest among the hardcore poor. By providing loans with a longer repayment period and
smaller installments (Rutherford, Maniruzzaman, and Sinha 2004, 45), inducing in-group
identity and self-esteem  (Dowla and Barua 2006, 214), providing free welfare services
(Rutherford, Maniruzzaman, and Sinha 2004, 45), and adopting the in-kind credit system
(Dowla and Barua 2006, 208), GB’s project for struggling members has successfully im-
proved the hardcore poor’s situation. Only three-point-one percent of female and about
24 percent of male struggling members did not regularly repay their installments during
the worst year of 1991 (S. R. Khandker, Khalily, and Khan 1995, 59). The ultimate goal
of the GB for these struggling members is to convert them from dependents to self-sus-
tainers  (Dowla and Barua 2006, 215). With microfinance’s help,  these struggling mem-
bers can gradually find a dignified livelihood, send their children to school, bring them-
selves back to the microfinance  system, and be  socially re-included again  (Rutherford,
Maniruzzaman, and Sinha 2004, 45).  The marginalized poor can be organized and in-
cluded by the mainstream of the society, which leads them to higher levels of political
awareness and participation as well (Schurmann and Johnston 2009, 521–22). Once these
outsiders become active citizens, they will be empowered to participate  in  the political
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process, call for opportunities to learn and practice autonomy, responsibility, cooperation,
and creativity, and develop a sense of “rich self”  (See Benn 2000).  On one hand, MFIs
have impacts on borrowers’ sense of “external” self, a political sense of self; people can
achieve more power in their household or community as a result of loan services. On the
other hand, MFIs have impacts on borrowers’ “internal” self, a teleological sense of self;
people feel attached to a higher level institution which they are able to freely and volun-
tarily join or leave (Ledgerwood 2013, 48).
New Public Sphere. Traditionally, a public space is unavoidably associated with state
or  governmental  organizations.  But  the  “public”  spaces  of  “mass  private  property,”
(Shearing and Stenning 1983, 496) which are created by NGOs in the conventionally
non-public sector for quasi-public purposes and the common good, have led to a blurring
of the public/private distinction.
Regular meetings and workshops in the microfinance system create a similar quasi-
public space, a sphere forged by NPOs for members’ public life. In this “public” sphere,
microloan  borrowers not only discuss group affairs but also start to contribute to each
other’s family activities, patronize each other’s microenterprise, and exchange business
information and in-kind favors (Chua et al. 2000, 91). This “public” life helps members
of  the  borrower  group share  their  information,  knowledge,  experience,  and emotions
(Dowla 2006, 117). They therefore enhance their networking skills and enlarge their so-
cial capital, which gradually enables them to invest in the communal life (Larance 1998,
30). Gradually, they not only supervise others’ status of repayment, but also start to pay
for each other’s missing repayments in order to increase the whole group’s collective ben-
efit (Dowla and Barua 2006, 77). That is, the old group lending mode of microfinance, on
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the basis of peer pressure and social sanction, is sublimed to a new mode of public coop-
eration.
In addition, the ritualization of MFIs’ discipline codes also makes regular meetings
and workshops in the microfinance  system sanctified as a “public” sphere outside the
family and the kinship, which used to be dominated only by the state or religious groups
in the pre-modern context. This new “public” sphere not only broadens members’ hori-
zons  but  also  helps  them  define  their  new  personal  identity  in  the  associated  life
(Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley 1996, 636). Acting as a ritual of modernization, MFIs’ dis-
cipline codes connect all members and strengthen their confidence and capacity of con-
trolling their own time, assets, income, and future. Finally, they realize how to socially
interact with other people outside their family. The life in the microfinance system consti-
tutes a forum for members to learn leadership and social skills, deliberate public affairs,
and mutually enhance their social and political consciousness (Auwal 1996, 36).
By hosting regular meetings  and workshops, MFIs create  an artificial  and virtual
“public sphere,” in which borrowers participate in microfinance programs and obtain an
apprenticeship of democracy through the self-managed solidarity groups  (Ben Hamida
2000,  8).  This  “idealized”  public  space strengthens  democratic  virtues  such as  open-
mindedness, tolerance, and respect for opposing viewpoints, while also creating an in-
formed and reasoned public opinion (Marsh 2000, 258). Due to their enhanced self-confi-
dence and expanded social experience, many microloan borrowers found it possible to
take part in the political, the “real” public, sphere (Dowla 2006, 117). Their participation
in the borrower group can be viewed as a kind of Participatory Budget,  an open and
democratic process of participation which enables ordinary members to deliberate and
make decisions collectively about budget-allocations (See Schugurensky 2004). Like Par-
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ticipatory Budget, MFIs invite borrowers to take part in regular meetings and audit finan-
cial statements or review MFIs operational standards. All of these participatory activities
actually promote members’ solidarity and concern for the common good.
Through participating in regular meetings, microloan borrowers learn how to discuss
public issues and run democratic procedures, which ensures the transparency of financial
transactions in the whole microfinance system (Dowla and Barua 2006, 79). They there-
fore become decision-makers, leaders, and a social force  (Latifee 2000, 7). As a result,
MFIs have become part of the social reformer; borrowers’ social force has become MFIs’
power to fight against economic, social, or political injustice.
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2. Economic Theories of the Microfinance Argument:
Modernization, Economic Development, and Economic Fairness
In this chapter, two sets of economic theories of democracy supporting the microfi-
nance argument are discussed; they are the democratic theories of modernization and eco-
nomic development, and the democratic theories of economic fairness. These two sets of
economic theories are not only theoretically plausible but also supported by various em-
pirical findings, although they once faced different challenges of cacophonies. Through
these two economic theories, microfinance is seen as a feasible strategy of democracy-
promoting, due to its possible contributions to increase the economic development and
fairness.
Democratic Theories of Modernization and Economic Development
The first theory supporting the microfinance argument defined in this thesis is the
democratic theory of modernization and economic development, which could be catego-
rized  into  three  perspectives:  The  first  claims that  economic  development  facilitates
democracy. The second sees the other way around. And the third interprets them as two
mutually reinforced factors. There has been found a strong positive relationship between
economic development and democracy: Higher levels of economic development signifi-
cantly increase the probability  of democracy  (Diamond 1992, 466).  Though some re-
searchers argued that  the relationship between economic  development  and democracy
might not be linear and there might exist multiple intervened factors amid the causal rela-
tionship (See Acemoglu et al. 2008; Arat 1988; Bourguignon and Verdier 2000; Diamond
1992; Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1993; Inglehart 1988; Jackman 1973; Muller
and Seligson 1994; Muller 1995; Neubauer 1967; Olsen 1968; Smith 1969), these cri-
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tiques  have  not  actually  challenged  the  core  proposition  of  the  modernization  theory
(Cheibub and Vreeland 2012, 9). It might be reasonable that there are many different di-
mensions of socio-economic development collectively having a multiple co-relation with
the level of democratization (Olsen 1968, 708–9), but the weight of the evidence suggests
that the “level of economic development appears to be the dominant explanatory vari-
able” in determining political democracy; it  can explain most of the variance by itself
than do other variables collectively (Bollen and Jackman 1985, 449).
Capitalist economic development created the burgher class whose existence was both
a catalyst and a necessary condition for democracy. The strength of the middle classes in
the society resulted in an alignment between burghers and throne and thus facilitated the
legitimation of democracy among the conservative strata. The existence of a strong and
independent bourgeoisie is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for economic de-
velopment and democratization. Without the bourgeois class, economic development may
lead to authoritarianism under authoritarianism or fascism (Boix and Stokes 2003, 524).
In addition,  the working class, economically expanded and politically strengthened by
capitalist development, by nature has an unambiguous preference for modern democracy
(Cheibub and Vreeland 2012, 30–31): Since capitalist development had transformed the
class structure, the enlarged working and middle classes started to self-organize, which
made it  more difficult  for elites  and landlords  to  monopolize  political  power  (Huber,
Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1993, 83–84). Due to the successful democratic exercises in
Western Europe and North America, democracy has been directly linked to economic de-
velopment and social well-being. As Olson (1993, 573) indicated, most of the richest and
liberal  countries  in  the  world  are  democracies.  It  is  well-believed  that  democracy  is
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deeply related to economic development  (Lipset 1960, 31); economic development and
the pro-capitalist regime are believed to induce non-democracies to democratize and fa-
cilitate  the  consolidation  of  democracy.  A more  economically  well-to-do  society  has
greater chance to turn itself into a democratic regime or sustains its existing democracy
(Lipset 1959, 75).
Most democratic transitions around the world occurred at the middle level of eco-
nomic development because democratization is unlikely to occur in poor countries while
it has already occurred in rich countries. About two-thirds of democratic transitions oc-
curred in countries with USD 300 and USD 1,300 per capita gross national product (here-
after GNP) (1960 U.S. dollars) (Huntington 1991, 62). Furthermore, economic develop-
ment not only works to foster democracy, it also provides necessary grounds for democ-
racies’  political  reform  (Burkhart  and  Lewis-Beck  1994,  907).  As  observed  by  re-
searchers, economic development powerfully maintained democracy during the period of
1950–90; a poorer country has greater likelihood of its breakdown of democracy  (Dia-
mond 2008, 6–7).  Countries with high per capita  GNP are less likely to change their
forms of government (whether or not democratic), since successful countries tend to re-
tain their political strategies (Hannan and Carroll 1981, 30–31).
Economic development (which is usually represented as industrialization, urbaniza-
tion, high educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the soci-
ety) is one of the basic conditions sustaining democracy. That is, high levels of socio-eco-
nomic development are associated with not only the presence but also the stability of
democracy (Diamond 1992, 466). Industrialization creates the necessary economic foun-
dation for both social mobilization of the population and ensuing political development
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(Olsen 1968, 710). Economic development thus has a strong causal impact on democratic
survival  (Cheibub and Vreeland 2012, 9–10). On average,  a society needs at  least  20
years of democratic experience to fulfill the egalitarian effect, which is the key to restrain
the urge of revolution (Muller 1988, 57). During the first generation of democratization,
economic  development  provides  the  society  necessary sustainability, while  the demo-
cratic regime provides the legitimacy of governance. Together, effectiveness and legiti-
macy compose the social system maintaining a stable democracy (Lipset 1959, 86).
On the other hand, political democracy buffers the developing nations from the ad-
verse effects of dependency conditions on social well-being and democratic disarticula-
tion (Wickrama and Mulford 1996, 387). As Olson (1993, 567) indicated, democracy is
the perfect securer of necessary conditions for economic growth, and democracy is the
most possible political institution encouraging citizens as individual economic actors to
be productive (i.e. the best environment promoting economic growth). The logic behind
these shared analogies is quite clear: In order to boom economy, it is widely assumed that
citizens’ self-governance is necessary rather than preferable; the greater the government’s
control  of  the economy, the lower the level  of democracy (Bollen 1979,  572).  Since
democracy has justifiably enjoyed the almost universal appeal of the spirit of rule of law,
the transparency of government, and the idea of accountability, democracy brings citizens
good governance and therefore a prosperous economic growth (Sharma 2007, 33–36).
All successful Western political practices suggest the excellency and superiority of
democracy. In return, these successful experiences legitimize the universal applicability
of democratic values. These values and the derived concepts of human rights, fundamen-
tal freedom, or independence (United Nations 2005, art. 135), are conversely perceived as
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the major reason of the great economic growth (see United Nations 2007, para. 6). As a
result, the free-market capitalism has been widely accepted as the sole route to the “nor-
mality” of economic development  (Hobson 2009, 383). Capitalism, free-market institu-
tions,  and  economic  prosperity  are  eventually  seen  as  the totem  of  socio-economic
modernity and the equivalent of democracy (Lehning 1998a, 234).
Both democracy and economic development need a well-respected and unambiguous
legal institution and the spirit of “rule of law” as their infrastructures. A well-developed
society hardly disrespects the transactions of the market, since a will-functioned market
could only be built on the mutual trust among traders. With the help of this trust, rational
egoists are gradually turned into effective cooperators (Newton 1997, 576). The mecha-
nism of coordination based on social norms not only has been an important part of mod-
ern  technologically  sophisticated  economic  activities  (Fukuyama  2001,  10),  but  also
plays an important role in citizens’ political engagement. Since the general public prefers
a gradual reform of society rather than a revolutionary change or the intransigent defense
for the status quo, economic development and the enlarged working and middle class by
nature tend to call for liberal democracy (Muller and Seligson 1994, 635).
Democratic Theories of Economic Fairness
The second theory supporting the microfinance argument defined in this thesis is the
democratic theory of economic fairness. Likewise, there are three perspectives: The first
claims that an unfair economic distribution would induce non-democracies to democra-
tize. The second asserts that a democratic institution would reduce economic inequality or
alleviate poverty among citizens. And the third sees the bi-directional causal relationships
between economic fairness and democracy.
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The rising economic inequality in a non-democracy, which usually results from in-
dustrialization, increases social unrest among citizens; resentments and frustrations would
weaken citizens’ allegiance to the regime (Dahl 1971, 103), which causes “legitimacy de-
flation” of governance (Nordlinger 1977, 93). In order to avoid the threat of revolution,
political elites in non-democracies reluctantly choose to extend the franchise to and share
their political power with the common people. That is why some researchers see eco-
nomic  fairness  as  the single strongest  factor  influencing  the  level  of  democratization
(Muller and Seligson 1994, 636): the greater economic inequality exists, the less people
trust in existing political institutions (Karl 2000, 156). 
Proponents of this argument believe that there is a direct causal relationship between eco-
nomic inequality and democratic instability, which mainly works through the structure of
property ownership; the society will fall into the “vicious cycle of inequality” and sever
cleavages among social groups, if the economic inequality keeps increasing (Barry 2012,
128). In that case, a democracy can hardly sustain itself as long as the high level of eco-
nomic inequality prevails (Karl 2000, 156). That is, economic development per se cannot
automatically guarantee the democratization or the consolidation of democracy.
Some researchers believe that democracy, as a popular regime, will eventually cause
economic equality among citizens since modern democracy provides citizens the oppor-
tunity to participate in the political process and therefore facilitates egalitarian political
decisions. Ruling parties in a democracy will propose various pro-welfare policies to sat-
isfy voters’ basic needs in order to win elections. That is, democracy provides political in-
centives in keeping the government responsible and accountable, and therefore reduces
the probability of presence of despotic tyranny. Once the government hears the real voice
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of people, it will understand how to improve people’s economic, social, and political con-
ditions (A. K. Sen 1999, 10–11).
A democratic process helps people’s voices be heard by “themselves” as well. People
among different social groups will have consensus only if they all have the opportunity to
fully express themselves and sufficiently discuss debatable issues. Otherwise, the major-
ity of the society will tend to make the political process subjected to their own interests
rather than the minority’s basic needs. Through the open dialogue and debates (between
the government  and the people,  or between different social  groups) in the democratic
process, democracy helps most, if not all, citizens understand each other’s needs, prefer-
ences, and priorities, which are necessary for constructing fair and consensual decisions
(Sharma 2007, 38). It is thus reasonable to expect that a popular regime to become asso-
ciated, in a facilitative sense, with a gradual reduction of economic inequality in the long
run (Lenski 1966, 318–25).
In addition, some researchers see a causally bidirectional relationship between eco-
nomic fairness and democracy. In democracies, the growing political power of the urban
lower income groups led to various protective and supporting legislations. As a result,
there is an inverted U-shape curve indicating the relationship between economic inequal-
ity and per capita income (See Kuznets 1955). Likewise, this Kuznets-like curvilinear re-
lationship also exists between economic inequality and the level of democratization, as a
study shows: economic fairness and democracy have a positive curve in poor countries,
whereas having a negative curve in rich countries (Chong 2004, 208). This curvilinear ar-
gument is also supported by historical case studies of Western societies such as Britain,
France, Germany, and Sweden  (See Acemoglu and Robinson 2000) and  explains why
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countries at intermediate levels of economic development often have difficulty sustaining
a stable democracy (Muller 1995, 981).
The Kuznets-like curve between economic fairness and democracy might be seen as
the best indicator of political stability in democracies (Karl 2000, 155). Democracies with
severe economic inequality are actually unstable, and it is difficult for them to function
correctly or even to maintain themselves as a polity  (Karl 2000, 156). In that case, the
urge for reducing inequality will emerge a “new democratic ideology” (Lenski 1966, 17),
which legitimizes the redistribution of political power in favor of the majority; economic
inequality would induce the society to turn itself into the process of democratization in
the first place, and the democratic regime then makes itself reinforced by keep reducing
economic inequality in return.  In this sense,  the best indicator of democratic stability is
the degree of economic equality, rather than the level of economic development.  As an
observation shows, most stable and lasting democracies were equitably prosperous; on
the contrary, most democratic regimes with highly economic inequality suffered their in-
stitutional breakdowns (Muller 1988, 64–65 figure 1).
Microfinance, Economic Development, and Economic Fairness
Proponents of the microfinance argument believe that microfinance will encourage
democratization or facilitate consolidation of democracy by promoting economic devel-
opment and reducing economic inequality. By providing necessary start-up capital, mi-
crofinance helps poor borrowers have an income-bringing or self-sustainable career. Due
to its “self-help” strategy, microfinance becomes a feasible solution for poverty allevia-
tion. In addition, microfinance could be beneficial to the overall society by overcoming
the poor’s liquidity  and unemployment problems through setting up small  businesses,
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funding the construction of homes, creating savings accounts, and funding further educa-
tion for children  (Shahidur R. Khandker 1998, 5–6). It is accordingly believed by re-
searchers that microfinance is able to increase economic development, reduce economic
inequality, and eventually empower the poor (Barry 2012, 133). Likewise, it is believed
by the United Nations as well that microfinance could facilitate its Millennium Develop-
ment Goal of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (See United Nations 2013).
The logic behind this argument is that a country can reduce its economic inequality
by alleviating poverty. In most developing countries, the problem of high economic in-
equality is usually related to their imperfect financial markets: Due to immature financial
regulations and poor administration of justice, “well-connected” political elites plundered
resources by rent-seeking activities and crony-capitalist  corruption; conversely, normal
people can hardly obtain capital  to invest in their  businesses or in themselves.  While
moral hazard and adverse selection are rampant in a country’s financial market, its eco-
nomic inequality will unstoppably increase (Kai and Hamori 2009a, 238).
It is thus well-believed that lack of financial capital substantially impedes the growth
of small businesses (Green, Kirkpatrick, and Murinde 2006, 1026). As an observation of
small businesses in Russia and Eastern Europe before 1992 shows, the poor could hardly
find their way out since their small businesses were announced illegal then by the com-
munist government and they could not obtain enough alternative resources to reproduce
or improve their living conditions (Mosley, Olejarova, and Alexeeva 2004, 410). Consid-
ering most MFIs in developing countries are more or less sponsored by government fund-
ing or international charity, microfinance could act as a “game changer” of the financial
market by breaking through the financial blockage and by providing the poor precious fi-
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nancial capital. For that reason, it is well-believed that microfinance can help the poor in-
crease their income by enhancing their productivity. Due to the small amount of install-
ment, microfinance  encourages borrowers to allocate credit efficiently and therefore to
increase the poor’s reproductive assets (Jalilian and Kirkpatrick 2002, 98), especially for
the landless or the proletariat  (Hossain 1988, chap. 3). For example, as a study of the
Center  for Agriculture and Rural  Development (now CARD Bank) in  the Philippines
shows, one unit of microloan can generate a gross income of three-point-zero-three times
in return (Hossain and Diaz 1997, 111–12). In addition, microfinance can help the poor
accumulate capital. Due to the nature of smaller amounts and shorter recovery periods, it
is easy for borrowers to repay the installment from their income flow and keep the repro-
ductive capital intact (Hossain and Diaz 1997, 108). As an observation shows, the amount
of working capital employed by borrowers increased three times during 27 months (Hos-
sain 1988, 10). Microfinance  can also enhance the poor’s consumptive capacity. As an-
other observation shows, borrowers’ per capita expenditure in the household rose about
20 percent since participating in the system (M. Pitt 1999, 6–7). Likewise, microfinance
can help the poor improve their quality of life. Through improvements in housing, water,
and sanitation, microfinance helps poor families reduce their ratio of expenditures on ba-
sic living needs and enhances their human capacity  (Bayulgen 2008, 531). In addition,
microfinance  can help the poor manage their risk of life and decrease the consumption
volatility in their household (See Parker and Nagarajan 2000). Due to their long-term ac-
cess  to  microloans, microfinance  members  have  become less  vulnerable  (Dowla  and
Barua 2006, 44): With the help of self-training of productivity, borrowers gradually in-
crease their capacity to cope with external shocks (such as natural disasters) at the indi-
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vidual level. As a study shows, a one year increase in microfinance membership reduces
the percentage change in per capita consumption caused by a unit shock by six percent
(Nidhiya 2003, 20–21). On the other hand, the mechanism of mutual-help in the microfi-
nance  system helps members decrease the household’s consumption volatility  (Kai and
Hamori 2009a,  239) and eventually  achieve  consumption-smoothing on the collective
level. As a study shows, a borrower having seven-point-five-eight years of membership
encountered only zero-point-eight-five percent of change of consumption between sea-
sons, whereas an average borrower having four-point-one-five years of membership suf-
fered 11.48 percent of change of consumption; while a brand-new borrower needs six-
point-five-one percent of annual income as the certainty equivalent to stay in the microfi-
nance system, an average borrower having four-point-one-five years of membership only
needs three-point-two-one percent of average annual income (Nidhiya 2003, 20–21). All
of these findings suggest that microfinance can not only enhance the poor’s sustainability
but also decrease the whole economic inequality in the society (Kai and Hamori 2009b,
3).
Clearly, microfinance did help the poorest out of their worst situation. According to
empirical findings, there were only 61 percent of borrowers below the poverty line, com-
pared with the figure of 80–84 percent of the general population in Bangladesh. Mean-
while, the population of moderate poverty among borrowers was reduced by eight-point-
five percent  over  seven years,  while  the extreme poverty dropped by 18.2 points  (S.
Khandker 2003, 17).
In addition, there were 57 percent of borrowers who crossed the poverty line in a 10-
year period, while the general population was 18 percent; 42.5 percent of borrowers who
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were still  poor, while the general population was 82 percent;  48 percent of borrowers
lived in extreme poverty, while the general population was 75 percent  (Hossain 1988,
68).  Among the poor, there are  only 72.5 percent  of borrowers were extremely  poor
(Todd 1996, 236). There were about 21 percent of Grameen members who moved out of
poverty within a span of four-point-two years of membership  (Shahidur R. Khandker
1998, 56).  In general, microfinance  reduces the probability of being below the poverty
line  by  zero-point-three  percent  for  males  and  zero-point-two  percent  for  females
(Shahidur R. Khandker 1998, 58–59). Likewise, all of these findings suggest that microfi-
nance can effectively reduce poverty (Ahlin and Jiang 2005, 27).
It is well-believed that microfinance  has the potential to act as an effective tool to
equalize the outcome of economic development by easing capital constraints on the poor
and by decreasing economic inequality  (Kai and Hamori 2009b, 10). By increasing the
poor’s income and lowering the rich’s gain, microfinance  could be used as an effective
redistribution tool (Kai and Hamori 2009a, 245). As the former Secretary-General of the
United Nations Annan said, “[m]icrofinance has proved its value, in many countries, as a
weapon against poverty and hunger[; i]t really can change peoples’ lives for the better ––
especially the lives of those who need it most” (See United Nations n.d.).
Moreover, microfinance  can  facilitate  social  inclusion  by helping  those  once-ex-
cluded rejoin the mainstream of society. Poor people, especially rural females, had been
deliberately marginalized by traditional financial institutions for a long time, due to lack
of valuable collateral, trustworthy credit history, and stable income flow (Chatnani 2010,
27). With microfinance’s help, the poor have gradually been re-included into the society.
In  that  case, microfinance  has  been  the  perfect  alternative  of  government-subsidized
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handouts after the paradigm shift of the idea of welfare policy since the 1970s  (Barry
2012, 130).
Proponents of the microfinance  argument  believe that microfinance  will  facilitate
democracy by increasing economic development, alleviating poverty, and reducing eco-
nomic inequality. In this sense, microfinance embodies the democratic ideal of equal re-
distribution through promoting the “capitalist market-oriented” economic development.
On one hand, microfinance helps the Leftist, who usually have the least access to govern-
mental resources or public goods, be re-included. On the other hand, microfinance assists
in the creation of an independent Rightist class of “small  capitalists” thriving without
state’s direct support, especially in post-communist areas (Mosley, Olejarova, and Alex-
eeva 2004, 410). Together, microfinance  fulfills a gradual change and a steady reform
through increasing the poor’s economic, social, and political capacity and engagement,
which echoes the Western liberal democratic institutions. In other words, microfinance
indirectly enhances democracy through its success in increasing economic development,
reducing inequality, and empowering the poor (Barry 2012, 129).
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3. Social Theories of the Microfinance Argument:
Gender Justice, Social Capital, and Civil Society
In this chapter, three sets of social  theories of democracy supporting the microfi-
nance argument  are discussed; they are the democratic  theories of gender justice,  the
democratic theories of social capital, and the democratic theories of civil society. Like the
economic theories of the microfinance argument, these three sets of social theories are
also theoretically and empirically supported respectively. Therefore, through these three
social  theories, microfinance is seen as a reasonable choice to cultivate the democratic
ground of the participatory citizenship and deliberative democracy.
Democratic Theories of Gender Justice
The third theory supporting the microfinance argument defined in this thesis is the
democratic theory of gender justice.  It is well-believed that reducing gender inequality
will induce non-democracies to democratize and consolidate existing democracy. This be-
lief could be deduced through two different perspectives: economic and political. Propo-
nents of the economic perspective believe that economic development can improve gen-
der equality by breaking down traditional gender divisions of labor within the household
and the economy, providing incentives for more equal investments in human capital and
reducing discrimination in the labor market (Mason and King 2001, 228). Because indus-
trialization brings higher occupational specialization, rises in educational levels, and in-
creases in levels of income, it is argued that economic development, or the process of
modernization, will simultaneously lead towards both gender equality and democratiza-
tion, (Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2004, 5). Some researchers see gender equality as the
necessary process of the modernization and the transformation of industrialized societies,
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rather than the  consequence of democratization induced by economic development  (In-
glehart, Norris, and Welzel 2002, 321). For that reason, although political conservatism of
some cultural traditions might retard the process of modernization, the underlying trend
toward both gender equality and democratization eventually becomes irresistible in the
long run  (Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2004, 5). Conversely, some researchers believe
that gender inequality has a negative impact on economic development. This negative im-
pact, the cost of gender inequality, could be particularly significant in today’s globalized
world. Inequalities in resource distribution and opportunity have a negative influence not
only on oppressed women but also on the whole society, and therefore would impede its
development (Mason and King 2001, 73–74). For that reason, improving gender equality
should be considered as part of any sustainable strategy (or even the premise) for devel-
opment. Empowerment of women and gender equality should be seen as prerequisites for
achieving political, social, economic, cultural and environmental security among all peo-
ples (United Nations 1995, para. 41).
On the other hand, proponents of the political perspective see the factor of gender
equality itself more crucial than the factor of economic development, although they might
still acknowledge the latter’s impact. Gender equality matters on the level of democrati-
zation much more than economic development since the power of ideas or cultural norms
is more pivotal than institutions or laws (Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2004, 7). Countries
in which the public is commonly in favor of the idea that “men make better political lead-
ers” have relatively lower proportions of female members of parliament, which suggests
that the factor of cultural norms has much greater impact than the democratic constitution
(Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2002, 325). In addition, some researchers even see eco-
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nomic  development  as  an  important  factor  only  if  it  helps  change prevailing  gender
norms (Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2004, 8). As Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer (2007,
1165) shows, people in non-Arab Muslim societies are more likely to support women’s
rights, and as well as democracy; on the contrary, the reverse is true in Arab Muslim soci-
eties. Some researchers accordingly use the level of support for gender equality as an in-
dicator  of tolerance  and personal freedom, and therefore the level  of democratization
(Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007, 1152). Theoretically, being equal, at least constitu-
tionally, is the core value of democracy; democracy is established in and by “legal rules”
which are valid in that (a) they have been sanctioned following due procedures, and (b)
the rights and obligations in law are universally applicable; every citizen, no matter the
sex, is considered a legal person (O’Donnell 2004, 33), i.e. “all [persons] are equal before
the law and that the law is no respecter of persons”  (Carrington 1922, 481). Another
study shows that  a democratic society usually has more female politicians and govern-
mental  officials  than  its  counterpart,  and the  relationship  between support  for  gender
equality in politics and the society’s level of political rights and civil liberties is remark-
ably strong (Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2002, 323, 330). For that reason, researchers
see it reasonable to inquire the extent of democratization by measuring women’s empow-
erment since the quality of democracy is determined not only by the form of institutions
but also by how fairly diverse social groups are treated (Moghadam 2004, 2–3). After all,
a democracy is not necessarily a gender-equal society, but the converse is true.
Gender equality can improve the chances that a democratic institution can emerge
and flourish. Support for gender equality is not just a consequence of democratization; it
is the embodiment of democratization, intellectually and constitutionally; it is part of a
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broad cultural change, transforming industrialized societies and supporting the spread of
democratic  institutions  (Inglehart,  Norris,  and Welzel  2004,  3).  A democratic  system
without gender equality is a degenerate form of democracy. Women need democracy to
flourish, but the converse also remains true: a true democracy needs female citizens’ par-
ticipation to fulfill itself in order to accomplish an inclusive, representative, and enduring
system of government (Moghadam 2004, 3).
Microfinance and Gender Justice
Proponents of the microfinance argument believe that microfinance will promote de-
mocratization or facilitate consolidation of democracy by diminishing or reducing gender
inequality. It has been found that microfinance has positive impacts on women’s income,
employment, consumption, fertility, and decision-making power. For example, the United
Nations sees the access to “bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit” as
a  fundamental  human  right  and  a  powerful  tool  to  eliminate  discrimination  against
women in economic and social life (United Nations 1981, art. 13); it also requires all its
member states to provide enough financial resources to fulfill their commitment to equal
rights, responsibilities, opportunities, and participation of policy-making processes on the
basis of gender equality (United Nations 1995, para. 36).
It is well-established that microfinance  can help poor women escape from poverty
and economic inequality  by increasing the female labor supply. Microfinance  has en-
hanced female borrowers’ productive means by increasing their access to cash income
generation from market-oriented small businesses as well as by increasing their owner-
ship of non-land assets (Shahidur R. Khandker 1998, 48–49, 149–50). As one observation
shows, the non-land assets of female borrowers increased by 15–29 percent of the total
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amount borrowed; after joining the microfinance system, female borrowers earned a reg-
ular cash income and increased their family income by around 72 percent; the female la-
bor supply in areas served by MFIs significantly significantly increased as well (Hassan
2002, 233–34). As a result, microfinance helps rural poor women fix the predicament of
lack of knowledge and skills to find full-time jobs in the mainstream economy  (N. K.
Shetty 2008, 95). Likewise, it was found in a study of MFIs in Calcutta that borrowers
have a significantly higher income compared with non-borrowers (M. M. Banerjee 1998,
78); and this  impact  is gender-differentiated since it  influenced on male microfinance
members’ employment only marginally and insignificantly, as a study of Grameen repli-
cations in the Philippines  shows  (Hossain and Diaz 1997, 109–10).  Though some re-
searchers might criticize it as just a palliative response to the economic distress of poor
women, microfinance’s usefulness for the poor’s capital accumulation is still recognized
(Keating, Rasmussen, and Rishi 2010, 162–63).
In addition,  the increase in assets and cash income attributed to microfinance  en-
hances female borrowers’ status in their households. With  microfinance’s help, female
borrowers in abusive relationships were able to gradually decrease their dependence on
husbands,  as  a  case study in Bangladesh  shows  (Kabeer  1998,  43–54). Microfinance
helps women form a resistance to their husbands’ wife beatings and alcoholism (Shrestha
1999, 30). By utilizing their social capital generated in the microfinance system, female
borrowers exchange information which reveals their abusive situation (Sanyal 2009, 538–
39), initiate collective actions to sanction male abusers, or call for help from the authori-
ties  (Rouf 2012, 289–90). As an observation of WWF members shows,  40.9 percent of
microfinance  members  who had experienced  domestic  violence  were  able  to  stop  it;
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while 10.2 percent stopped it due to their personal empowerment, 28.7 percent stopped
the domestic violence through group action (Working Women’s Forum 2000, 22). Micro-
finance also helps reduce domestic violence against women by channeling resources to
families through female borrowers (Schuler et al. 1996, 1740), reduce quarrels about fi-
nancial problems in the household, and increase respect from their husbands  (Cheston
and Kuhn 2002, 21). Clearly, the relationship between participation in microfinance and
the reduction in abuse is direct and hardly suspicious (Kabeer 1998, 44); bringing finan-
cial resources to their household alone was enough for female microfinance borrowers to
improve their spousal relationships (Kabeer 1998, 21).
It might be common for women in developing countries to under-perceive their own
contribution in the household, which depreciates their status in the household  (A. Sen
1987, 24). However, it is well-established that microfinance  helps female borrowers re-
adjust their perceived contribution and breakdown position. With microfinance’s help, fe-
male borrowers’ position of negotiation in the household is significantly enhanced. Most
female borrowers not only experienced an increase in knowledge of resource manage-
ment, decision-making, and self-esteem, but also had considerable power in utilizing and
managing their microloans. For example, as an observation of Grameen members shows,
97 percent of borrowers felt that the wife contributes more to the family, compared with
77 percent of non-borrowers (Dowla and Barua 2006, 48–49). Approximately, 82 percent
of Grameen members reported being empowered to control their microloans, rather than
their husbands (Rouf 2011b, 17, 23).
Researchers had similar findings in an observation of Nepalese MFIs: most female
borrowers made business decisions jointly with their husbands, compared with the past
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when their husbands dominated the whole decision-making power before their participat-
ing in the microfinance system (PLAN International n.d., 37). Around 68 percent of fe-
male borrowers in the Women’s Empowerment  Program in Nepal  experienced an in-
crease in their decision-making roles in family affairs (Ashe and Parrott 2001, 8). Like-
wise, the percentage of female borrowers in the Philippines who make financial decisions
in the household increased from 33 to 51 percent after joining the program, while only 31
percent of general female adults increased their household decision-making power, and
the percentage of female borrowers managing their enterprise funds increased from 44 to
87 percent  (See Ledesma 2002, as cited in Cheston and Kuhn 2002). In Rwanda, as an
observation of MFIs shows, 54 percent of borrowers experienced an increase in their abil-
ity to control or influence business decisions, and 38 percent, mostly female, experienced
an increase in decision-making in their families (World Relief Rwanda 1999, 4, as cited
in Cheston and Kuhn 2002).
There is a significant trend that female borrowers are reducing their dependency on
their  male  family  members  and have  a  more  equitable  relationship  in  the  household
(Dowla and Barua 2006, 46). Since most MFIs intentionally adopt democratic and con-
sensual decision-making processes to operate the  borrower group, this experience and
training induces female borrowers to adopt a similar philosophy to manage their house-
holds (Rouf 2011c, 60), which leads women to take a greater role in the decision-making
processes, have greater bargaining power vis-a-vis their husbands, and have greater free-
dom of mobility (M. M. Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright 2003, 30).
The civic and democratic education provided by MFIs help remove barriers in em-
powering women against male domination in household and community; more and more
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poor women now feel confident to go outside and participate in social life (Hassan 2002,
233). As an observation shows, about 96 percent of Grameen members communicated
with their neighbors more than once per month while 56 percent of them did not know
their neighbors before (Rouf 2011b, 23). Researchers had similar findings in an observa-
tion of MFIs in Rwanda: 69 percent of borrowers reported having an increase in self-es-
teem (World Relief Rwanda 1999, 7, as cited in Cheston and Kuhn 2002). With microfi-
nance’s help, many rural women now are able to participate in their communal life. For
example, female borrowers of the Centre for Self-help Development (CSD), a Nepalese
MFI, collectively own houses available to CSD, which uses them as a social space for
communal  gathering  (Shrestha  1999,  18).  Likewise, microfinance  participants  partici-
pated in communal affairs significantly more than non-participants, as a survey of MFIs
in Ghana conducted by Freedom From Hunger shows: At the time of survey, 87 percent
of borrowers had given business advice in the last six months, compared with 44 percent
of the same respondents before joining the microfinance program three years earlier, as
well as 35 percent of non-participants and 50 percent of members of control communities
(MkNelly and McCord 2001, 9–10). Once poor women join the microfinance  system,
they will not only “see” what the real meaningful community is but also “be seen” with
respect in both their homes and the community (Hashemi 1997, 115).
As a result, microfinance  facilitates not only social but also legal and political em-
powerment of women. The cultural and social changes induced by microfinance carry out
various pro-gender-equality laws and institutions. While some NPOs actively have used
microfinance  as an opportunity to mobilize women on gender issues  (Bayulgen 2008,
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528), most MFIs unintentionally and indirectly but actually promoted female borrowers’
political and legal empowerment.
For example, GB uses women-exclusive housing loans to protect female borrowers’
ownership of their houses so that they will not be evicted from their own house due to di-
vorce  (Dowla and Barua 2006, 50). Likewise, Human Development Initiatives Nigeria
(HDI),  a Nigerian MFI, helps widows legally  reclaim their  husbands’ inheritance and
gain legal access to their joint bank accounts (Cheston and Kuhn 2002, 25). Microfinance
helps women become cooperative and autonomous by mobilizing the collectivities (Keat-
ing, Rasmussen, and Rishi 2010, 163). By enhancing poor women’s knowledge and self-
confidence and by enlarging their social capital, microfinance also provides them neces-
sary tools and skills needed for formal democratic processes  (Cheston and Kuhn 2002,
25), which eventually facilitates their sense of political efficacy (Rouf 2011a, 124). All in
all, microfinance encourages women’s civic engagement and therefore exemplifies a po-
litical renegotiation, turning the biased and exclusive social contract into a more equi-
table, inclusive, and democratic one (Keating, Rasmussen, and Rishi 2010, 163; Keating
2004, 423–27), which leads more women to participate in existing democratic regimes
(See Barry 2012; Bayulgen 2008; Cheston and Kuhn 2002; Hadenius and Uggla 1996;
Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley 1996; Rouf 2011a; Yunus 2002).
Democratic Theories of Social Capital
The fourth theory supporting the microfinance argument defined in this thesis is the
democratic theory of social capital. It is well-believed that enlarging or accumulating so-
cial capital can induce non-democracies to democratize and facilitate the consolidation of
democracy (See Putnam 2001).  Social capital, according to World Bank’s definition, is
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“the norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of societies that enable
people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals” (World Bank 1999, 1). Social capi-
tal is “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of
a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance
and recognition”  (Bourdieu 1997, 51). It  refers to  social  organizations,  such as trust,
norms, and networks, which are able to improve the efficiency of society by facilitating
coordinated actions  (Putnam, Leonardi,  and Nanetti 1993, 167). It is also a subjective
phenomenon composed of a range of values and attitudes of citizens that influences or
determines how they relate to each other, which predisposes citizens to cooperate, trust,
understand, and empathize with each other –– to treat each other as fellow citizens, rather
than as strangers, competitors, or potential enemies (Newton 1997, 575–76).
Since social capital consists of not only aspects of social structures but also certain
actions of actors within the structures (Coleman 1988, 98), it consists of three elements:
(a) norms and values, (b) networks, and (c) consequences; together, social capital pro-
duces collective facilities and resources (Newton 1997, 575). In any case, social capital is
necessarily economically productive, although it mainly enhances the efficiency of the
combination process of various resources and types of capital. As Putnum (1993, 36) in-
dicated, social capital “enhances the benefits of investment in physical capital and human
capital.” In other words, social capital is not only an input into the system of production
but also a shift factor of the entire production function (Grootaert 1998, 9).
Trust among economic actors and in the institution works as the platform are that
makes transactions of the market possible. It is trust to turn rational fools into effective
cooperators (Arrow 1972, 357). Therefore, a strong co-relationship exists between social
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capital and economic growth. As Simmel (1950, 326) indicated, social capital is “one of
the most important synthetic forces within society.” It not only directly lowers transaction
costs  and  reduces  principal-agent  problems,  but  also  indirectly  facilitates  economic
growth via investment in physical and human capital. Due to the diffusion of innovation
facilitated by cooperative and trusting behaviors among citizens, a high trust society will
be more effective (Whiteley 2000, 443, 452).
Social capital exists in the relationships between citizens and therefore is a commu-
nal network consisting of the social relationships  (Coleman 1988, 113). The dense net-
works of civic engagement fostered by various civil associations are  horizontal, as op-
posed to the vertical networks of patron-client arrangements or of traditional hierarchical
organizations. With the help of social capital, citizens are able to trust others because of
this  embedded horizontal  network of reciprocity  (Bayulgen 2008, 533). Social  capital
helps citizens become capable of cooperating for mutual benefit and eventually of bol-
stering the performance of the polity and the economy, i.e. “[s]trong society, strong econ-
omy; strong society, strong state” (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993, 173, 176).
The horizontal network of trust and reciprocity are crucial for social and political sta-
bility and cooperation. It constitutes a force that helps bind society together by transform-
ing individuals  from self-seeking and egocentric  calculators  into  fellow citizens  with
shared interests, shared social relations, and a shared sense of the common good (Newton
1997, 576). These shared identities can better motivate and facilitate citizens’ collective
actions. The norms and routines produced within and across these networks can create a
sense of citizenship and produce a habit of political participation. With the help of social
capital, people are able to create their own radius of trust. Social capital is, therefore, re-
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sponsible for converting the Hobbesian state of nature to a livable community, where citi-
zens  are  able  to  cooperate  with others  through overlapping social  groups  (Fukuyama
2001, 8). Once a group’s social capital produces positive externalities, the radius of trust
will be larger than the group itself, and vice versa (Harrison 1985, 7–8).
Social capital is the glue holding various social institutions together (See World Bank
n.d.). Coordination based on social capital plays an important part of modern sophisti-
cated public affairs. It facilitates coordination and cooperation for members’ mutual bene-
fit as well as for the society as a whole (Foley and Edwards 1996, 46–47). In small face-
to-face communities, “thick” social capital (Williams 1988, 8) is the essential ingredient
of mechanical solidarity. Communities of this kind are generally socially homogeneous,
isolated, and exclusive, and are able to exercise the strict social sanctions necessary to re-
inforce thick trust (Coleman 1988, 105–8). However, the “thick” social capital of primary
relations is only capable of bolstering primary democracies that have emerged in the early
stage of modernization (Newton 1997, 578). For that reason, the “thin” or abstract form
of social trust is more than crucial for the governance and public affairs of a modern soci-
ety (Misztal 1996, 72). On one hand, the political participation through parties or interest
groups relies on the mechanism of in-group trust. On the other hand, the direct political
participation of citizens relies on their trust of institutions, such as the electoral process.
Together, social trust among citizens and between the ruled and the political institutions
make democracy possible. Higher levels of social capital and a robust civil society may
reduce the government’s ability to directly oppress citizens and provide space for the
growth of organized opposition to a non-democratic regime (Bayulgen 2008, 537).
56
Democratic Theories of Civil Society
The fifth theory supporting the microfinance argument defined in this thesis is the
democratic theory of civil society. It is believed that a strong civil society would induce
non-democracies to democratize and facilitate the consolidation of democracy. A modern
civil society is created through forms of self-constitution and self-mobilization. It is a
realm of voluntary social interaction between market and state, which is self-generating,
self-supporting, and autonomous (Diamond 1994, 5). It is a “set of diverse non-govern-
mental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and … can never-
theless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society” (Gellner 1994, 5). In
this sense, civil society is a public sphere where citizens deliberate about their common
affairs (Fraser 1990, 57) and is based on a tolerant recognition of difference and diversity
(Hall 1998, 34), due to its nature presuming a diverse but specialized and professional-
ized citizenry  (Munkler 2006, 98) who keeps interacting and communicating with each
other (Bryant 1993, 399).
Civil society is such a social realm related to networks, norms, and trust, facilitating
coordination and cooperation for social members’ mutual benefit  (Putnam 1993, 35). In
this realm, citizens can freely fulfill themselves by cooperating with each other voluntar-
ily. With the help of social capital, collective actions are successfully transformed into it-
erated  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  games,  which  means  a  win-win  outcome  is  possible
(Fukuyama 2001, 16–17).
In a liberal democracy, civil society serves to balance the government’s power and
protect citizens. In the absence of a robust civil society, the government has no choice but
to step in to organize atomized individuals who are incapable of organizing themselves
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(Fukuyama 2001, 11). Instead, in an environment with a well-developed civil society, cit-
izens are able to create and accumulate their social capital by participating in various vol-
untary associations. In this dense network of civic engagement, norms of generalized rec-
iprocity and social trust could be conveniently fostered (Lehning 1998b, 35). Civil soci-
ety with a denser network is highly likely to invite citizens to mutually cooperate for the
common good (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993, 173, 176).
Voluntary associations play a critical role in civil society. They provide citizens an
infrastructure to organize themselves  and initiate  collective actions,  which produces a
symbolic affiliation, an in-group identity, and social integration; they also forge a public
forum for citizens to discuss public issues and shape their common knowledge (Minkoff
1997, 606–7).  True meaningful citizenship can only be cultivated and fulfilled through
civic engagement, i.e. participation in various voluntary associations or in communal ac-
tivities from philanthropic deeds to socio-political movements, rather than any form of
electoral participation  (Benn 2000, 1).  A healthy democratic regime needs  intermediate
civic associations to generalize common trust among citizens. From the bottom up, rather
than the other way around, democratic institutions must be built up in citizens’ everyday
life of trust and civic engagement (Lehning 1998a, 239). For that reason, civil society is
one of the prerequisites for a democracy, or even for any efficient functioning political
system, because it cultivates citizens with the capacity of voluntary cooperation for com-
mon purposes (Hadenius and Uggla 1998, 45).
Democratic participation needs a collective identity among citizens which incorpo-
rates the idea of people as collective agents of their own destiny. In addition, it also needs
to adopt an everyday practice which encourages citizens to be active and collaborative
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(Gamson 1991, 49). Therefore, social capital plays a political role in a modern democ-
racy, i.e. to maintain the civil society and transform isolated individuals into sociable citi-
zens. With the help of social capital, social individuals transform themselves into citizens
in the political community, who are confident to interact with other citizens. In that case,
social capital, public-spiritedness, and a robust civil society have become necessary ele-
ments of democracy (Lehning 1998b, 35). Likewise, citizenship needs to be learnt and it
can only be cultivated in civil society through citizens’ various types of voluntary partici-
pation (Benn 2000, 1). That is, civil society in fact plays the role of the “school of citizen-
ship and democracy,” where citizens learn the public morality of voluntary cooperation
(See de Tocqueville 1898). Public morality and knowledge of civic associations, together,
support democratic societies.
Once citizens are well-equipped and trained in civil society, they will know how to
self-organize and self-mobilize against all potential tyranny. In this sense, civil society
therefore is an autonomous sphere of social power where citizens can resist authoritari-
ans, protect themselves from tyranny, correct unjust institutions, and democratize from
below (Foley and Edwards 1996, 45–46). As cases of the democratization in Russia and
Eastern Europe and in Latin America show, civil society energizes resistance to the tyran-
nical regime and provides an independent sphere of action for nurturing a pro-democratic
regime (Foley and Edwards 1996, 38).
Microfinance, Social Capital, and Civil Society
Proponents of the microfinance argument believe that microfinance will promote de-
mocratization or facilitate consolidation of democracy by helping the poor enlarge social
capital, strengthening the civil society, and eventually converting social individuals into
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autonomous citizens in a democratic society.  Though poor people in most developing
countries are short of physical capital, human capital, financial capital, and cultural capi-
tal, they usually have abundant social capital due to the nature of their rural life style and
community-based economic activities  (Balkin 1993, 253). However, poor people in de-
veloping countries can hardly utilize their social capital in the first place without the help
of an MFI, due to lack of organizational skills, a short radius of trust, and poor knowledge
of  risk-management;  normal  villagers  can  hardly  engage  in  collective  action  sponta-
neously. In that case, MFIs play the external agent to instill necessary skills and provide
an enforcement mechanism (Woolcock 1998b, 132). Microfinance can help the poor not
only organize themselves to initiate collective actions for their mutual interests but also
enlarge, accumulate, and reproduce social capital.
Due to the spillover effect, poor people are able to utilize their social capital to de-
velop other forms of capital. In the beginning, borrowers use their existing social capital
developed in their personal networks as social collateral. After that, they gradually de-
velop new social capital in the network of the microfinance  system. Finally, they earn
their  credit history in the formal financial system by proving their trustworthiness. This
spillover effect of social capital helps the poor voluntarily cooperate not only financially
but also socially. For example, borrowers can not only share marketing information dur-
ing  regular  meetings,  but  also  use  the  networks  to  exchange  scarce  resources,  swap
household labor, and meet social obligations in the village  (Larance 1998, 21). On one
hand, borrowers use their social capital to monitor each other’s repayment. On the other
hand, they use their increasing economic capital and growing prosperity to oil these so-
cial networks (Todd 1996, 76). They even leverage their social capital fostered in the mi-
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crofinance system to expand the networks horizontally to outsiders of the kinship group
(Dowla 2006, 119). This spillover effect of social capital also works for MFIs. borrowers
not only develop and utilize their own social capital but also help develop a collective so-
cial capital for the whole industry of microfinance. For example, due to the high repay-
ment rate since its inception, GB created a reputation of trustworthiness for the poor, in-
dicating those once-excluded actually have financial potential. This positive reputation
acts as a public good for all MFIs around the world. Almost every Grameen replication
(whether  or  not  official)  enjoys  the free-ride  on this  trust-building  without  necessary
long-term investment (Amin, Becker, and Bayes 1998, 108–9).
More importantly, this spillover effect of social capital in the microfinance system
can nurture an independent civil society (Hadenius and Uggla 1998, 44–45). Microloans
not only provide borrowers pecuniary returns but also enhance their social basis of self-
esteem, mutual trust, and self-empowerment; as a result, borrowers have become citizens
of solidarity (Berenbach and Guzman 1992, 15). With microfinance’s help, borrowers are
able to trust others in the community because of the horizontal networks of generalized
reciprocity based on rational cooperation and social capital. For borrowers, the borrower
group not only monitors their performance of repayment and motivates their incentive of
being trustworthy, but also facilitates their collective actions. As a result, norms and disci-
plines introduced by MFIs help borrowers create a sense of interdependence with each
other, a habit of participation, and a public morality toward the whole political commu-
nity  (Bayulgen 2008, 534, 537). The participatory democratic system adopted by most
MFIs helps borrowers self-organize at the micro level of grassroots, develop their social
capital, and then transform them into modern citizens (Rouf 2011a, 130–31). The democ-
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racy in the microfinance system helps borrowers develop decision-making power in not
only family but also public affairs (Amin, Becker, and Bayes 1998, 225). Though MFIs
mainly focus on turning borrowers into creditworthy borrowers rather than active citizens
(Rouf 2011a, 132), the process of participatory democracy that is run in the microfinance
system actually enlightens citizens and encourages their engagement (See Schugurensky
2004). Microfinance  therefore has the potential to go far beyond credit delivery; it can
change borrowers’ quality of life. In addition, it can create and cultivate social capital in
the political community (Bayulgen 2008, 538). Though having limited impacts on formal
association, microfinance has substantial impacts on patterns of informal association. Mi-
crofinance helps borrowers expand their informal social networks into the linkage with
formal political institutions  (Mosley, Olejarova, and Alexeeva 2004, 419). Marginalized
people are thus empowered to resolve conflicts collectively in their neighborhoods (Rouf
2011c, 139). Furthermore, the participatory and deliberative democracy in the microfi-
nance system improves borrowers’ sense of political efficacy (Rouf 2011a, 126). As a re-
sult, the mutual trust built between the MFI and borrowers has another level of spillover
effect on all other institutions in the society, which leads to multilateral and vertical trust-
building in poor rural areas or urban slums (Dowla 2006, 110). By enhancing social capi-
tal, which in turn influences political development, microfinance influences formal politi-
cal development (Barry 2012, 125); it constitutes an apprenticeship of democracy through
the self-managed solidarity groups, and borrowers obtain the power that influences be-
yond their family (Ben Hamida 2000, 8). In other words, microfinance not only empow-
ers borrowers financially and socially but also politically, especially in a pro-democratic
direction.
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4. Critiques and the General Discussion of the Microfinance Argument
In this chapter, various critiques of all aforementioned theories supporting the micro-
finance argument are introduced. Respectively, these critiques either oppugn the validity
of the microfinance argument or doubt the desirable consequences of microfinance prac-
tices. However, as the general discussion made in this chapter shows, these critiques have
not necessarily challenged the microfinance argument. On the contrary, these non-sys-
tematic, sporadic, and detailed critiques conversely exhibit that the microfinance argu-
ment is theoretically intuitive based on the common understanding of the experiences of
modern democratic developments.
Critiques: Economic Dependence and Unsustainability
Some critics challenge the democratic theory of modernization and economic devel-
opment. They argue that democracies are not necessarily a more economically efficient
form of government than any other; democracies’ rates of aggregate growth, savings, and
investment are no theoretically better than non-democracies  (Schmitter and Karl 1991,
85). For example, Muller (1988, 64) found a strong inverse association between democ-
racy and economic development, and the level of economic development is seemingly the
irrelevant variable. Likewise, although some researchers of African democracies indeed
found positive examples in Botswana  and  Niger  (Narayan, Narayan, and Smyth 2007,
909–10), others also found a counterexample in Chad (Narayan, Narayan, and Smyth
2011, 26). All of these findings of inconsistency are challenging the democratic theory of
modernization and economic development.
On the other hand, the optimism of the microfinance argument is questioned as well.
For example,  some  critics argue that  the interest  rate  charged by MFIs  is  commonly
higher than commercial finance agencies (Rosenberg, Gonzalez, and Narain 2009, 148–
49, as cited in Hudon and Sandberg 2013, 571). What is worse, some microfinance NPOs
who are funded by government or international donors even charged double the rates of
those charged by commercial MFIs (Barry 2012, 138). In addition, some critics argue that
microfinance brought social exclusion to those neediest, such as widows, single mothers,
or migrant laborers, since social capital is not necessarily fairly-distributed  (Schurmann
and Johnston 2009, 522–23). Considering the potential of better repayment capacity, peo-
ple tend to form their  borrower group with wealthier or more trustworthy fellow mem-
bers. Likewise, due to having no supporting inputs such as land, capital, additional work-
ing family members, human capital,  and knowledge of running a business, the poorer
borrowers will be highly likely to receive a relatively lower rate of return. As a result,
poorer-connected members tend to be socially sanctioned (See Chaves 1996, as cited in
Hassan 2002, 222). Therefore, microfinance replicates existing social inequalities (Cole-
man 1988, 103); the access to microloans can actually increase borrowers’ income in-
equality  due  to  the  fact  that  those  potent  members,  the  relatively  better-educated  or
charismatic ones, usually control the agenda and enjoy disproportionate influence during
the  “democratic”  process  dealing  with  borrower  group-affairs  (See  Mayoux 2001,  as
cited in Hudon and Sandberg 2013, 565).  It was found by some critics that MFIs have
gradually shrunk their  focus on their  discipline codes of conduct in order to  promote
profit  generation  (Rouf  2011b,  20–21).  Considering  the  possibility  that  MFIs  might
choose  to  move  their  focus  from the  hardcore  poor  to  those  more  profitable  targets
(Dowla and Barua 2006, 203–4), the nature of microfinance could be understood as a
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mechanism of exploiting members’ social connectedness (Besley, Coate, and Loury 1993,
794).
Some critics warn that microfinance might cause borrowers to fall into the vicious
circle of loan dependency. It is not necessarily the case for borrowers to be successful in
their microenterprises (Hudon and Sandberg 2013, 568–69). Without significant “gradua-
tion rate,” the rate at which the self-employed build up enough wealth to start full-scale
firms, borrowers might be entrapped in the loan dependency in the long-run (Ahlin and
Jiang 2005, 29). Due to poor borrowers’ low rate of return on their microloans, they need
to borrow new loans to repay their old loans and fall victim to perpetual debt (See Ahmed
1997, as cited in Hassan 2002, 237–38). It suggests that credit  alone cannot shift  the
problem of poverty (N. K. Shetty 2008, 88).
Moreover, some critics argue that MFIs themselves are the victim of dependency on
external funding. Since most MFIs are not profitable and the income by charging loan in-
terest is insufficient to cover their operating costs, they are actually dependent on govern-
ment funding or international charities (Hassan 2002, 255–57). As an observation shows,
three-quarters of MFIs were owned or funded by governmental agencies or international
NPOs, who are usually politically motivated and expect their political influence in MFIs
served in return (See Helms 2006, as cited in Bayulgen 2008, 529). In this sense,  GB’s
success could be explained by the relatively loose international money supply, and to-
day’s MFIs can hardly replicate its success due to the global financial conditions chang-
ing (Gibbons 1999, para. 41).
In Leftist terms, the microfinance movement not only created an unrealistic expecta-
tion of  poverty alleviation but  also facilitated  the transformation  of global  capitalism
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(Fermon 1998, 129). In this sense, the primary objective of the borrower group is MFI’s
financial  health rather than borrowers’ welfare  (Rankin 2001, 29). While emphasizing
equal opportunity of credit as the rhetoric, what MFIs really focused on is the individual
attainment of borrowers, which replicates the capitalist ideologies and practices (Isserles
2003, 43, 46). The whole microfinance system could be understood as a mechanism of
accumulation by dispossession (Keating, Rasmussen, and Rishi 2010, 160).
Critiques: Ineradicable Gender Oppression
Though only few, if any, critics challenge the democratic theory of gender justice,
some still doubt if microfinance really brings the poor gender equality. According to this
critical perspective, female borrowers will suffer more, rather than less, once joining the
microfinance system. For example, married female borrowers are not only evaluated on
their own merits or capabilities of repayment but also judged by their spouses’ delinquent
behaviors, such as drinking or gambling, which might exclude poor women from the mi-
crofinance  system  (Schurmann and Johnston 2009,  522).  Likewise,  female  borrowers
need to take on their husbands’ responsibility of default if their husbands refuse or cannot
repay (Goetz and Gupta 1996, 54). Therefore, most female borrowers are pressured from
both  sides  (Gibbons  1999,  para.  16).  As  an  observation  shows,  female  borrowers  in
Africa  not  only need to  assume traditional  obligations  such as  providing subsistence
crops but also have to take the responsibility of providing cash for their husbands and
children, since they now have their own career and income (Mayoux 2001, 451–52). Fe-
male borrowers are dominated by their spouses so deeply that they cannot actually enjoy
the benefits from the financial gains of their microenterprises (Rouf 2011b, 18). As a sur-
vey of female borrowers shows, only 37 percent of female borrowers have significant
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control of the usage of their microloans, while about 63 percent have partial, very limited,
or no control over their microloans  (Goetz and Gupta 1996, 49 figure 1). In many con-
texts, female borrowers defer the control of loans to their husbands or are convinced to
invest their loans in male-led activities (Bayulgen 2008, 538). In addition, some critics ar-
gue that microfinance programs have little impact on female borrowers’ benefits (Fermon
1998, 129). As a study of microfinance in India shows, microfinance has no discernible
effect on female borrowers’ education and health in the short run and has no impact at all
on their empowerment in the household, even in the longer run  (A. V. Banerjee et al.
2013, 34).
Since women are always idealized as “mothers” and are assumed to have more re-
sponsibility of caring for the family (Isserles 2003, 48), female borrowers are usually bur-
dened by caring for children and the elderly, which might jeopardize their microenter-
prises or other income-earning activities (Bayulgen 2008, 538). Once the total workload
increases substantially, many female borrowers will have no choice but to decrease their
participation in local public life  (Ben Hamida 2000, 8–9) or even to keep themselves
away from other social and political activities (Mayoux 2005, 12). Likewise, women usu-
ally focus on the enhancement of their children’s living conditions and education while
their husbands usually spend their microloans on productive or capital-increasing activi-
ties (Hassan 2002, 233). As a result, female borrowers might be entrapped in the vicious
circle of dependency  (Mayoux 2001, 453): Due to low income and barely sustainable
economic activities, once female borrowers fail their microenterprises, they will need to
ask money from their husbands for their installments, which increases their dependency
on their spouses and might produce new sources of tension in the household (White 1991,
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30). For that reason, many critics argue that microfinance can hardly facilitate a harmo-
nious or communicative spousal relationship. For example, Todd  (1996, 212) indicated
that  many  female  borrowers  overestimated  the  size  of  their  economic  contribution
brought by MFIs in the household; in many cases, women’s improved breakdown posi-
tion only came at the expense of a weakened breakdown position of their husbands. Men
might feel threatened in their role as the primary breadwinner in the household since they
are usually excluded by many MFIs in the first place (Armendáriz and Roome 2008, 2).
As a result, the rate of incidence of domestic violence attributable to microfinance in-
creases, (Haque n.d., 60–62) and so does the likelihood of divorce (Mayoux 2005, 19).
All in all, opponents of the microfinance argument assert that MFIs did not actually
engage in promoting gender equality but only provided services for their clients’ prof-
itable development (Rouf 2011b, 24). What MFIs preached is a kind of economism, in-
stead of a politically progressive women’s consciousness (Rouf 2011c, 38–39). And the
whole idea of microfinance neglects the larger infrastructural conditions impinging on
women’s actual ability to self-sustain and only throws women into the maelstrom of the
global business world (Ehlers and Main 1998, 436–37).
Critiques: Ethnic Conflicts and “Bad” Civil Society
Though still recognizing its importance, some researchers indicate that the outcomes
of social capital are not necessarily positive  (Ito 2003, 323), nor  truly a “public good”
available to society at large  (Foley and Edwards 1996, 41). Though voluntary associa-
tions may increase mutual trust among social members, it can facilitate rent-seeking ac-
tivities as well. Dense concentrations of social capital might be highly segmented across
spatial and ethnic divides. (J. Fox 1996, 1091). Relatively homogeneous associations in a
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heterogeneous society may strengthen trust and cooperative norms within ethnic groups,
but weaken trust and cooperation between social groups, which is highly likely to result
in ethnic conflicts or civil wars (Knack and Keefer 1997, 1277–78). Ethnic conflicts may
destroy physical capital, dissolve social capital, deteriorate human capital, and eventually
disrupt the economy. An ethnically  fragmented society might be prone to competitive
rent-seeking behavior by the different ethnic groups and have difficulty providing public
goods for citizens (Grootaert 1998, 17).
Civil society by nature is grounded in a certain degree of self-government, discipline,
and communication, a realm that consists of power relations (Sven 2006, 142). Therefore,
a dense but segregated society may or may not contribute to effective democratic gover-
nance. In order to facilitate a pro-democratic environment, voluntary associations must
not be “polarized” or “politicized;” rather, they must bridge social and political divisions
(Putnam 1995, 665). Increasing social capital among citizens without the sense of com-
monality and civilized citizenship might result in severe conflicts between social groups
by using social capital to bond their in-group consolidation rather than to bridge the gap
between social groups (Minkoff 1997, 609). Thus, there is no guarantee that enhancing
social capital will necessarily lead to a more equitable society; the renewal of civil soci-
ety and the generation of social capital within it cannot necessarily solve ethnic conflicts
inside the society (Foley and Edwards 1997, 550). For example, the increasing social cap-
ital among peasants and workers in El Salvador in the 1960s and 1970s led to a growing
polarization and, eventually, the upheaval of civil war (See Baloyra 1982; Stanley 1996).
Likewise, civil society will be enfeebled after the transition to democracy if there are no
real meaningful autonomous social groups and civilized citizens  (Hadenius and Uggla
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1998, 47). For example, since the democratic elections, a significant number of non-gov-
ernmental organizations (hereafter NGOs) in South Africa closed or drastically curtailed
their operations  (Caliguire and James 1996, 61–62). NGOs in Eastern Europe, who had
helped overthrow the communist regime, gradually declined due to the whole civil soci-
ety, traditions, moral norms, spirit of rule of law, and voluntary organizations being de-
stroyed or greatly weakened after democratization (Smolar 1996, 33).
For that reason, opponents of the microfinance argument believe that the social capi-
tal that MFIs helped borrowers enlarge will eventually be tied to the political motives of
international NPOs, politicians, or ethnic group leaders (Weber 2002, 541 note 32). The
mechanism of social sanction adopted in the microfinance system could worsen ethnic or
class cleavages. The discipline inflicted by MFIs on borrowers and the consolidation in
the borrower group should be understood as nothing but a tool of manipulation. In this
sense, microfinance could hardly facilitate real democracy.
General Discussion of the Microfinance Argument
Theories of Economic Development and Fairness. In general, an economically well-
developed country may facilitate democracy by increasing its investment in education,
enhancing human resources, reforming communication technology, and strengthening the
middle class. However, the country’s wealth might not bring a pro-democratic environ-
ment if the wealth was built on the basis of minerals or energy. Hence, the inconsistency
of  the  democratic theory of modernization and economic development could be seem-
ingly found in such cases. As a study shows, countries with full civil liberties have signif-
icant economic rate of return, while the form of government alone (whether or not demo-
cratic) has limited impacts on economic development  (Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett
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1995, 27). Seemingly, what really matters in the democratic theory of modernization and
economic development is how citizens become involved in the democratic process rather
than whether  or  not  they  have  regular  election.  In  addition,  it  is  well-believed,  after
decades of debate, that there exists  an inverted U-shape curve of relationship between
economic fairness and democracy: These two factors are negatively co-related before the
democratization, but are positively co-related after democratization. That is, it is impor-
tant for a democratic society to reduce its economic inequality and alleviate poverty in or-
der to consolidate itself.
It  might  be true that  MFIs  usually  charge  relatively  higher  interest  for  their  mi-
croloans, compared with traditional financial agencies. But most commercial banks only
approve loans to borrowers having guarantors, collateral, or good credit history. That is,
MFIs might be the only source where the poor are able to obtain loans. In addition, as a
matter of fact, the interest rates that most MFIs charge are usually lower than usual credit
card interest rates  (Hudon and Sandberg 2013, 571) or the consumer credit rates those
formal financial agencies charge (Rosenberg, Gonzalez, and Narain 2009, 152–53). Con-
versely, even the relatively “high” interest rates charged by MFIs could only cause “little”
financial  burden on borrowers due to the affordable amount  of installments  (Gibbons
1999, para. 71). In addition, the nature of microloans, that are intentionally designed to be
repaid in small  installments  every week, helps  borrowers accumulate  precious capital
since they can repay from their income flow (Hossain and Diaz 1997, 108).
It might be true as well that group lending would sometimes exclude the poorest
group in society. However, the project for struggling members in the G2 system that has
existed since 2000 shows the possibility of social inclusion that MFIs have the potential
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to facilitate. As studies show, the poorest are still willing to be financially and eventually
socially re-included, with  microfinance’s help and under no peer pressure  (Dowla and
Barua 2006, 261–62; S. R. Khandker, Khalily, and Khan 1995, 59), which lead them to
higher levels of political awareness and participation as well  (Schurmann and Johnston
2009, 521–22).
It might be true that some borrowers could fall into loan dependency due to their low
rate of return. However, the average rate of return of microloans in most MFIs is notably
high. For example, the rate of return on investment of borrowers in CARD Bank in the
Philippines is estimated at 117 percent; a single unit of CARD-microloan can generate
three-point-zero-three times of gross income (Hossain and Diaz 1997, 103, 111–12). As
studies of microfinance in India and Kenya show, the rates of return are even higher than
the case of CARD-microloans (See Harper 1998, as cited in Gibbons 1999, para. 72). In
addition, most of those MFIs whose members have low rate of return did once enjoy a
period of high rate of return in the beginning stage. The rate of return of an MFI, after all,
is highly related to the macro economic performance of the society. An upward shift in
the labor demand curve is required for both improved productivity and wage gains on a
sustainable basis, which calls for a structural transformation of the rural economy (S. R.
Khandker, Samad, and Khan 1998, 96). For most developing countries, the key to the
success of poverty alleviation is growth and productivity potentials in the economic sec-
tor, which is highly dependent on productivity increase and technological change. What
MFIs can help, at best, is only to increase employment and production on the existing
level of technology (S. R. Khandker, Samad, and Khan 1998, 122). It would be unrealis-
tic and unreasonable to criticize MFIs for not helping level  up borrowers’ production
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technology. The level of a society’s production technology is usually related to the level
of capital investment, which requires efficient institutions; laws and regulations protect-
ing property rights are especially crucial to economic growth and investment (Knack and
Keefer 1995, 223). Part of the reason why developing or under-developed economies suf-
fer stagnant growth is related to the fact that their governments did not efficiently play
their economic role in protecting property rights and managing economic externalities
(Grootaert 1998, 16). Though microfinance has nothing to do with law-amendment di-
rectly, it can still promote a transparent and pro-democratic set of institutions indirectly
by enlarging borrowers’ social capital, enhancing their citizenship, and facilitating their
democratic participation. With microfinance’s help, it will be easier for the poor to be or-
ganized and mobilized in order to take collective actions and make their voice heard in
the political arena (Berger 1989, 1019).
It might be true that MFIs could be dependent on government funding or interna-
tional charity. For MFIs, the available alternative sources of funds might be members’
savings, stockholders, or interbank positions, which require the authorities to amend the
regulations and treat them as formal financial agencies, which is not something MFIs can
decide. As a matter of fact, there are more and more MFIs trying to reduce their depen-
dency on external funding by engaging in saving business or releasing their stocks to the
open market or borrower members. In addition, there are more and more MFIs trying to
enhance their  profitability  in order to make themselves commercially sound  (Gibbons
1999, para. 40). But this solution suggests as well that MFIs will have less tolerance to
borrowers’ default or late repayments. In order to keep MFIs from becoming voracious
big companies, the idea of social enterprise could be the way out of this predicament; it
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depicts a double bottom line to achieve a productive balance between mercenariness and
unselfishness (Woller, Dunford, and Woodworth 1999, 55).
It  might  be true that  microfinance  eventually  brings a pro-capitalist  environment.
However, as Weber  (2001, 8) pointed out, microfinance  has the capacity to perform a
“dual function” in the global political economy: On one hand, microfinance facilitates
global financial  integration and extends the network of financial  services to the local
level. On the other hand, microfinance helps build a political safety net and offset income
insecurity by absorbing surplus rural labor in growing informal sectors. Though microfi-
nance seemingly worsens the disadvantages of global capitalism, it cultivates the resis-
tance to the invasion of the Neo-Liberalist world order by enlightening the poor with fi-
nancial and business skills, by consolidating isolated individuals with self-help/mutual-
help groups, and by turning those excluded into empowered citizens. Without  microfi-
nance’s help, the poor have no choice but to depend on the limited options handed out by
the government or big companies.
Theories of Gender Justice. Most criticisms against the democratic theory of gender
justice focus on whether or not microfinance is really advantageous to promoting gender
justice, rather than on the theory  per se. Though critical  cases of MFIs, such as what
Banerjee et al. (2013) found in India, seemingly contradict the democratic theory of gen-
der justice, it might be seen as an exception rather than the general case. As a matter of
fact, misconduct or misregulation among MFIs operated in India has often found. For ex-
ample, the Indian authority once significantly intervened the operation of local MFIs in
2006 (See Duflo and Walton 2007). In addition, there still are multiple empirical studies
of microfinance in India supporting the democratic theory of gender justice. For example,
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Reddy and Manak (2005, 3) found female borrowers’ economic, social, and political sta-
tus  was  significantly  improved  under  microfinance’s  help.  Likewise,  Bali  and  Yang
(2009, 541) found that female borrowers were significantly empowered while there was
no discernible change in the control group.
It might be true that those counterexamples of microfinance in India imply the inva-
lidity of the microfinance argument, but the factor of gender inequality is hardly the sole
cause. In another study of microfinance in India, Leach and Sitaram (2002, 575) indicated
that  even if  microfinance  helped overcome men’s hostility, women’s microenterprises
were unlikely to have been viable commercially. However, they (2002, 575, 584–85) also
admitted that the imperfect outcome of microfinance should be attributed to borrowers’
lack of necessary skills (such as literacy) or basic financial knowledge (e.g. some borrow-
ers misunderstood those loans as their wages paid by MFIs). Microfinance alone cannot
overthrow the structure of gender inequality in developing countries. As Mayoux (1995,
56) indicated, if the structure of gender inequality remains, microfinance may only in-
crease women’s workload and responsibilities without increasing the income they can
control. However, microfinance is nearly the only feasible production option for poor
women in developing countries (Ehlers and Main 1998, 436–37). The undeniable fact is
that women can more or less benefit from the structural change in the long run through
the enlarged social capital, organized collective actions, and empowered political engage-
ment brought by microfinance.
Theories of Social Capital and Civil Society. Theoretically, the mechanism of social
capital, at the macro level, needs the existence of well-accepted social norms and a social
structure with a closure as its prerequisites in order to limit negative external effects and
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encourage positive ones. (Coleman 1988, 105–6). That is, the mechanism of social capi-
tal, by nature, tends to cause conflicts between social groups, unless there exists a plat-
form of common good and public morality; the advantage of social capital facilitating in-
group consolidation will  be totally  countervailed  by the disadvantage  of conflicts  be-
tween social groups. In that case, social capital will be productively meaningless. For that
reason, citizens need to be educated in civil society and learn to deal with pluralistic con-
flicts (Helmich and Lemmers 1998, 14). In civil society, norms provide citizens explicit
guidelines of how to behave. Citizens need to be “civilized,” to consider others as fellow
citizens of equal dignity in their rights and obligations (Shils 1991, 12–13), and learn to
co-exist harmoniously with other citizens (Hall 1998, 32). If citizens are unable to inter-
nalize codes of public morality or self-discipline,  civil society can hardly exist  (Osse-
waarde 2006, 207).
In this sense, civil society can never be separate from the state. Though civil society
incorporates, it cannot dispense with the state  (Walzer 1991, 8). The state can never re-
place civil  society, nor the other way around  (Lehning 1998a, 241–42).  The state and
civil society can be mutually reinforcing through their common support for the legitimacy
of the state’s rule (Lehning 1998b, 37). For a long time, civil society has been mislead-
ingly credited with the political peace, which is actually maintained by the state  (Foley
and Edwards 1996, 47). Citizens need the state institutionally to protect their civil rights
and fulfill their basic needs (Shils 1991, 4).
In almost every case, people are members of civil society and citizens of the state at
the same time (Alexander 1994, 21). It is such dual membership that makes civil society
a porous public sphere where citizens are able to sublime themselves from dilettantism to
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excellence, under protection from the state (Alexander 1997, 129). On the other hand, cit-
izens need to learn knowledge of justice and public morality from the state (Walzer 2011,
74), especially  from how the state legally  behaves and how it  justifies  its  legitimacy.
What goes in the realm of the state will eventually be reflected in the realm of civil soci-
ety (Gamm and Putnam 1999, 553). In addition, the formal institutional structure of a so-
ciety demonstrates the trustworthiness of social norms for citizens all the time. Citizens
can learn to trust each other by trusting in institutions and social norms in the first place;
as a study shows, countries with formal institutions effectively protecting citizens’ funda-
mental rights provide a more conducive environment to cultivate mutual trust and cooper-
ation (Knack and Keefer 1997, 1279).
In a  democratic  society, social  groups must  keep themselves  “moderate”  and re-
strained in whatever they demand; they must not reinforce social cleavages and conflicts
but bridge them by communicating and cooperating with the others; they must insist to be
institutionalized as part of the social organism; they must cherish and treat democratic
spirits as the “first cause” in a pluralistic world (Foley and Edwards 1996, 47 note 21).
That is, civil society needs a liberal constitutional democracy, which is the only known
political system capable of co-existing with a multiplicity of cultures and ethnicities, as
its prerequisite (Lehning 1998b, 28–30). A strong civil society has to be strong in protec-
tion of citizens’ basic needs and interests, i.e. fundamental rights in defense of civil soci-
ety’s self-governance and independence  (Alexander 1994, 45). It refers to what Walzer
(1991, 9) called the paradox of the civil society argument: civil society requires political
agency, the democratic state, as its premise in the first place, and civil society strengthens
democracy in return.
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Civil society thereby appeals to a compound of public philosophy, which is capable
of simultaneously covering voluntariness, reason, cooperativeness, and civility. And lib-
eral democracy is exactly the starting point for this purpose (Kymlicka 1997, 86). After
all, even the most self-interested transactors care about being treated fairly and treating
others fairly, and are willing to resist unfair players even at a positive cost (Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler 1986, 299). A fair procedural institution will encourage social mem-
bers to defer to the authorities, act on behalf of groups they are affiliated with, and remain
within the community (Tyler 1999, 222). With the help of procedural democracy, civil so-
ciety will be a real forum, a setting of settings (Walzer 1991, 5–6), and therefore a “free
school” of public philosophy (de Tocqueville 1898, vol. 2 page 142).
On both the theoretical and the empirical level, microfinance  is able to enlarge the
poor’s social capital  and help civil society flourish. The enlarged social capital  that is
brought by microfinance helps the poor become empowered. The self-discipline imparted
through microfinance helps the poor participate in public life while respecting pluralistic
ethnicities, cultures, and religions. Most values microfinance promotes are not only com-
patible with but also complementary to democratic spirits. Though it might be true that
microfinance has nothing to do with directly forging a democratic environment in the first
place, microfinance can facilitate the consolidation of democracy once the democratic
regime and the primary constitution have been established.
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Conclusion
This thesis theoretically reviews the microfinance argument. This thesis dialectically
exams the fundamental idea of the Grameen experience, the prototype of modern microfi-
nance, and analyzes the theoretical foundations of the microfinance argument.  As this
thesis analyzed, MFIs’ core objectives are to convert their borrower members into socia-
ble, law-abiding, and cooperative modern citizens, by intensifying their in-group identity,
providing various group benefits and welfare services, and creating a member-based vir-
tual public sphere. In this realm MFIs forged, microfinance borrowers are able to cooper-
ate socially, economically, and politically; they are able to sublime their personal life, so-
cial life, and economic life into political life; they are able to achieve themselves in the
way of being a moral agent living in the public realm. As a result, the once excluded un-
derclass become democratic participants by equipped themselves with their experience of
microfinance.
At the macro or collective level, this process of turning borrower members into mod-
ern citizens  would be accompanied  with economic  development  and redistribution  of
wealth. As many empirical observations suggested, the microfinance practice is related to
economic  development  and equality. Meanwhile,  as  other  researchers  suggested,  eco-
nomic development and (in)equality are highly related to democratic development. As a
result of logic, democracy could be seen as the concomitant of microfinance.
Likewise,  this process of democratization of microfinance would be accompanied
with the enhancement of gender justice, the accumulation of social capital, and the vital-
ization of civil society. As observations pointed out, microfinance significantly, helps mi-
croloan borrowers accumulate and reproduce their social capital, empowers female par-
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ticipants and improves their financial,  economic, and political conditions, and emerges
and consolidates civil society. Consider the theoretical connections between social fac-
tors, such as gender justice, social capital, and civil society, and democracy, it is accord-
ingly reasonable to see democracy as the concomitant of microfinance as well.
With microfinance’s help, the poor not only obtain financial capital, but also grasp
the opportunity to be re-included into the mainstream of global society. By providing fi-
nancial services, MFIs fulfill the poor’s basic needs and empower them in their everyday
life. With MFIs’ help, microloan borrowers gradually equipped themselves with knowl-
edge and skills of finance, production, economics, health, and public affairs, which are
exactly what modern citizens need while participating in the democratic life. Though mi-
crofinance can hardly make the institutional or constitutional democratization happen in
the first place, which is definitely unreasonable to be expected, microfinance does have
the potential to facilitate the consolidation of existing democracy, as this thesis argued.
However, this process of democratization of microfinance is not straightforward or
irreversible. Traditionally, democratization is initiated by political elites in the govern-
mental sector. The outcomes of democratization therefore are ineluctably submitted to the
will of superpowers or influenced by internal ethnic cleavages. As a result, most demo-
cratic  regimes in developing areas were established without fulfilling  the prerequisite
conditions such as a public philosophy pursuing the common good, the spirit of rule of
law and constitutionalism, protection of property and civil rights, an emerging middle
class, a strong and flourishing civil society, and an institutional, social, and cultural rem-
edy for class conflicts, gender inequality, ethnic oppositions. Microfinance can only rest
its success on the enlarged civil society, enhanced human capital, trustworthy institutional
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systems, and civilized pluralistic participation; so does democracy. Therefore, microfi-
nance could be a useful tool to facilitate democratization and consolidate existing democ-
racy, although its positive outcomes might not be necessarily expected in the short run,
while negative results might be highly likely to be observed.
Implication of This Thesis
Having  regular  elections  alone  is  not  necessarily  a  real  meaningful  democracy.
Democracy needs citizens’ substantial participation, which requires a more economic, so-
cial, and political inclusion as the precondition. If the consolidation of democracy had
been facilitated by microfinance, a more efficient, transparent, and participatory demo-
cratic society would have been established more easily and the outcome of democratiza-
tion would have lasted longer and been more peaceful. In that sense, microfinance could
not only be connected to democracy, but also facilitate, strengthen, and consolidate it.
Nevertheless, what this thesis has contributed is a preliminary effort to clarify the
theoretical delicacies about the democratization of microfinance. This field still calls for
follow-up research works, especially empirical studies, to provide supportive evidence
for the microfinance argument. For that goal, this thesis has provided a comprehensive
theoretical framework for future researchers. The five theories introduced in this thesis
could respectively be a single model of empirical analysis. Based on whether local, na-
tional, or international data, future researchers can test the causal relationships of vari-
ables among these five theoretical models. Beyond that, future researchers are able to de-
velop a multivariate model consisting of these five theoretical constructs as well to evalu-
ate the actual impact of microfinance on democracy. Whether to test the statistical rela-
tionship between variables in various models, or to fill in blind spots of understanding
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with deep narratives or case studies, the theoretical framework provided in this thesis
could be the first step of the ground. Although it might not for this thesis to be an irre-
placeable vanguard or pioneer of the democratic research of microfinance, this thesis can
still contribute to the academia by showing a plausible theoretical explanation of the mi-
crofinance argument.
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Ferraro, Gayle. 2000. Śiddhanto: Sixteen Decisions. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Media.
Foley, Michael W., and Bob Edwards. 1996. “The Paradox of Civil Society.” Journal of 
Democracy 7(3): 38–52.
———. 1997. “Escape from Politics? Social Theory and the Social Capital Debate.” 
American Behavioral Scientist 40(5): 550–61.
Fox, Jonathan. 1996. “How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of 
Social Capital in Rural Mexico.” World Development 24(6): 1089–1103.
Fraser, Nancy. 1990. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy.” Social Text 25/26: 56–80.
Fukuyama, Francis. 2001. “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development.” Third World 
Quarterly 22(1): 7–20.
Gamm, Gerald, and Robert D. Putnam. 1999. “The Growth of Voluntary Associations in 
America, 1840-1940.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29(4): 511–57.
Gamson, William A. 1991. “Commitment and Agency in Social Movements.” 
Sociological Forum 6(1): 27–50.
Gellner, Ernest. 1994. Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals. New York, NY: 
Allen Lane/Penguin Press.
Gibbons, David S. 1999. “International Replication of Grameen Banking: What Can the 
Poultry Network Learn from It?” Presented at the Poultry as a Tool in Poverty 
Eradication and Promotion of Gender Equality, held by Danish Agricultural and 
Rural Development Advisers’ Forum, Tune Landboskole, Denmark. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/ac154e/AC154E00.htm.
Gibbons, David S., and Jennifer W. Meehan. 1999. “The Microcredit Summit’s 
Challenge: Working Toward Institutional Financial Self-Sufficiency While 
Maintaining a Commitment to Serving the Poorest Families.” Journal of 
Microfinance (ESR Review) 1(1): 131–92.
Goetz, Anne Marie, and Rina Sen Gupta. 1996. “Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power, 
and Control over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh.” World 
Development 24(1): 45–63.
Grameen Bank. 2013a. “16 Decisions.” http://www.grameen.com/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=22&Itemid=109.
88
———. 2013b. “Grameen Bank at a Glance (October,2011).” http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=175.
———. 2013c. “Grameen Bank Declares Dividends at 100%.” http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=294&Itemid=282.
———. 2013d. “Higher Education Loans.” http://www.grameen.com/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=1178&Itemid=1004.
———. 2013e. “Notes to the Financial Statements of Grameen Bank: As at and for the 
Year Ended 31 December 2010.” http://www.grameen.com/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=1065&Itemid=941.
———. 2013f. “Past Sixteen Years at a Glance (1997-2012).” http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid=430.
———. 2014. Grameen Bank Monthly Report, Issue 411. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Grameen 
Bank. Grameen Bank Monthly Report 411. http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=453.
Green, Christopher J., Colin H. Kirkpatrick, and Victor Murinde. 2006. “Finance for 
Small Enterprise Growth and Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries.” 
Journal of International Development 18(7): 1017–30.
Grootaert, Christiaan. 1998. Social Capital: The Missing Link?. Washington, DC: Social 
Development Family, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development 
Network, World Bank. Social Capital Initiative Working Paper 3. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-
Capital-Initiative-Working-Paper-Series/SCI-WPS-03.pdf.
Hadenius, Axel, and Fredrik Uggla. 1996. “Making Civil Society Work, Promoting 
Democratic Development: What Can States and Donors Do?” World Development
24(10): 1621–39.
———. 1998. “Shaping Civil Society.” In Civil Society and International Development, 
eds. Amanda Bernard, Henny Helmich, and Percy B Lehning. Paris, France: 
Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, 43–56.
Hall, John A. 1998. “The Nature of Civil Society.” Society 35(4): 32–41.
Ben Hamida, Essma. 2000. “Empowering Women Through Micro-Credit: A Case Study 
from Tunisia.” Presented at the Mediterranean Development Forum, Cairo, Egypt.
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/119089/workshops/civil.html.
Hannan, Michael T., and Glenn R. Carroll. 1981. “Dynamics of Formal Political 
Structure: An Event-History Analysis.” American Sociological Review 46(1): 19–
35.
89
Haque, Trina. Women and the Rural Informal Credit Market in Bangladesh. Dhaka, 
Bangladesh: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies. Research Report 104.
Harrison, Lawrence E. 1985. Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind: The Latin American 
Case. Lanham, MD: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and 
University Press of America.
Hashemi, Syed M. 1997. “Building up Capacity for Banking with the Poor: The Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh.” In Microfinance for the Poor?, ed. Hartmut Schneider. 
Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 109–
28.
Hashemi, Syed M., Sidney Ruth Schuler, and Ann P. Riley. 1996. “Rural Credit Programs
and Women’s Empowerment in Bangladesh.” World Development 24(4): 635–53.
Hassan, Mohammad Kabir. 2002. “The Microfinance Revolution and the Grameen Bank 
Experience in Bangladesh.” Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 
11(3): 205–65.
Hassan, Mohammad Kabir, and Luis Renteria-Guerrero. 1997. “The Experience of the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh in Community Development.” International 
Journal of Social Economics 24(12): 1488–1523.
Helmich, Henny, and Jos Lemmers. 1998. “Introduction.” In Civil Society and 
International Development, eds. Amanda Bernard, Henny Helmich, and Percy B 
Lehning. Paris, France: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development, North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, 
11–15.
Hobson, Christopher. 2009. “The Limits of Liberal-Democracy Promotion.” Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political 34(4): 383–405.
Hossain, Mahabub. 1988. Credit for Alleviation of Rural Poverty: The Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/fpr/resrep/65.html.
———. 1993. “The Grameen Bank: Its Origin, Organization and Management Style.” In 
The Grameen Bank: Poverty Relief in Bangladesh, ed. Abu N. M. Wahid. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 9–21.
Hossain, Mahabub, and Catalina P. Diaz. 1997. “Reaching the Poor with Effective 
Microcredit: Evaluation of a Grameen Bank Replication in the Philippines.” 
Philippine Sociological Review 45(1-4): 89–121.
Huber, Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D Stephens. 1993. “The Impact of 
Economic Development on Democracy.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7(3): 
71–86.
90
Hudon, Marek, and Joakim Sandberg. 2013. “The Ethical Crisis in Microfinance: Issues, 
Findings, and Implications.” Business Ethics Quarterly 23(4): 561–89.
Hung, Chi-Kan Richard. 2002. “From South to North: A Comparative Study of Group-
Based Microcredit Programs in Developing Countries and the United States.” In 
Replicating Microfinance in the United States, eds. James H. Carr and Zhong-Yi 
Tong. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 223–54.
———. 2006. “Rules and Actions: Determinants of Peer Group and Staff Actions in 
Group-Based Microcredit Programs in the United States.” Economic 
Development Quarterly 20(1): 75–96.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” American Political 
Science Review 82(4): 1203–30.
Inglehart, Ronald, Pippa Norris, and Christian Welzel. 2002. “Gender Equality and 
Democracy.” Comparative Sociology 1(3/4): 321–45.
———. 2004. “Gender Equality and Democracy.” Unpublished Manuscript.
Isham, Jonathan, Daniel Kaufmann, and Lant Pritchett. 1995. Governance and Returns 
on Investment: An Empirical Investigation. Washington, DC: World Bank. Policy 
Research Working Paper 1550. http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1995/11/01/000009265
_3961019154124/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.
Islam, Jamal Nazrul, Haradhan Kumar Mohajan, and Rajib Datta. 2012. “Aspects of 
Microfinance System of Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.” International Journal of 
Economics and Research 3(4): 76–96.
Isserles, Robin G. 2003. “Microcredit: The Rhetoric of Empowerment, the Reality of 
‘Development As Usual.’” Women’s Studies Quarterly 31(3/4): 38–57.
Ito, Sanae. 2003. “Microfinance and Social Capital: Does Social Capital Help Create 
Good Practice?” Development in Practice 13(4): 322–32.
Jackman, Robert W. 1973. “On the Relation of Economic Development to Democratic 
Performance.” American Journal of Political Science 17(3): 611–21.
Jalilian, Hossein, and Colin Kirkpatrick. 2002. “Financial Development and Poverty 
Reduction in Developing Countries.” International Journal of Finance and 
Economics 7(2): 97–108.
91
Jansson, Tor. 2001. Microfinance: From Village to Wall Street. Washington, DC: Inter-
American Development Bank. Sustainable Development Department Best 
Practices MSM-113. http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-
1.9.27082/3145_03145.pdf.
Kabeer, Naila. 1998. “Money Can”t Buy Me Love’? Re-Evaluating Gender, Credit and 
Empowerment in Rural Bangladesh. Brighton, United Kingdom: Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex. Discussion Paper. 
http://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=GB1999011278.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1986. “Fairness and the 
Assumptions of Economics.” The Journal of Business 59(4): 285–300.
Kai, Hisako, and Shigeyuki Hamori. 2009a. “Microfinance and Inequality.” Research in 
Applied Economics 1(1): 237–48.
———. 2009b. Microfinance and Inequality. Munich, Germany: Munich Personal 
Research Papers in Economics Archive. MPRA paper 17572. http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/17572/.
Karlan, Dean S. 2007. “Social Connections and Group Banking.” The Economic Journal 
117(517): 52–84.
Karlan, Dean S., Tomoko Harigaya, and Sara Nadel. 2009. “Evaluating Microfinance 
Program Innovation with Randomized Controlled Trials: Examples from Business
Training and Group versus Individual Liability.” In Moving Beyond Storytelling: 
Emerging Research in Microfinance, eds. Todd A. Watkins and Karen Hicks. 
Bingley, United Kingdom: Emerald, 215–49.
Karl, Terry Lynn. 2000. “Economic Inequality and Democratic Instability.” Journal of 
Democracy 11(1): 149–56.
Keating, Christine. 2004. “Developmental Democracy and Its Inclusions: Globalization 
and the Transformation of Participation.” Signs 29(2): 417–37.
Keating, Christine, Claire Rasmussen, and Pooja Rishi. 2010. “The Rationality of 
Empowerment: Microcredit, Accumulation by Dispossession, and the Gendered 
Economy.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 36(1): 153–76.
Khandker, Shahidur. 2003. Micro-Finance and Poverty: Evidence Using Panel Data from
Bangladesh. The World Bank. Policy Research Working Papers 2945. 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-2945.
Khandker, Shahidur R. 2012. Grameen Bank Lending: Does Group Liability Matter?. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper 6204. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.com/handle/10986/12058.
92
Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. 1995. Grameen Bank: 
Performance and Sustainability. Washington, DC: World Bank. Discussion Papers
306. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?
direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=33815.
Khandker, Shahidur R., Hussain A. Samad, and Zahed H. Khan. 1998. “Income and 
Employment Effects of Micro-Credit Programmes: Village-Level Evidence from 
Bangladesh.” Journal of Development Studies 35(2): 96–124.
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1995. “Institutions and Economic Performance: 
Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures.” Economics and 
Politics 7(3): 207–27.
———. 1997. “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country 
Investigation.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4): 1251–88.
Krauss, Nicolas, and Ingo Walter. 2009. “Can Microfinance Reduce Portfolio Volatility?” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 58(1): 85–110.
Kuznets, Simon S. 1955. “Economic Growth and Income Inequality.” The American 
Economic Review: 1–28.
Kymlicka, Will. 1997. “Do We Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to 
Carens, Young, Parekh and Forst.” Constellations 4(1): 72–87.
Larance, Lisa Young. 1998. Building Social Capital from the Center: A Village-Level 
Investigation of Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank. St. Louis, MO: Center for Social 
Development, Washington University in St. Louis. Working Papers 98-4. 
http://www.gdrc.org/icm/grameen-lisa.pdf.
Latifee, H. I. 2000. “Microfinance and Poverty Reduction: Experiences of Grameen 
Operation in Asia.” Presented at the The Potential and Limitations of Economic 
Initiatives in Grassroots Development: Current Issues and Asian Experiences, 
Rajendrapur, Bangladesh.
Leach, Fiona, and Shashikala Sitaram. 2002. “Microfinance and Women’s 
Empowerment: A Lesson from India.” Development in Practice 12(5): 575–88.
Ledgerwood, Joanna. 2013. “Institutional Providers.” In The New Microfinance 
Handbook: A Financial Market System Perspective, ed. Joanna Ledgerwood. 
Washington, DC: World Bank, 171–96. 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/book/9780821389270.
Ledgerwood, Joanna, and Julie Earne. 2013. “Credit.” In The New Microfinance 
Handbook: A Financial Market System Perspective, ed. Joanna Ledgerwood. 
Washington, DC: World Bank, 213–29. 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/book/9780821389270.
93
Lehning, Percy B. 1998a. “Towards a Multicultural Civil Society: The Role of Social 
Capital and Democratic Citizenship.” Government and Opposition 33(2): 221–42.
———. 1998b. “Towards a Multicultural Civil Society: The Role of Social Capital and 
Democratic Citizenship.” In Civil Society and International Development, eds. 
Amanda Bernard, Henny Helmich, and Percy B Lehning. Paris, France: 
Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, 27–42.
Lenski, Gerhard. 1966. Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. New 
York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 
53(01): 69–105.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday.
Littlefield, Elizabeth, Syed Hashemi, and Jonathan Morduch. 2003. Is Microfinance an 
Effective Strategy to Reach the Millennium Development Goals?. Washington, 
DC: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor. Focus Note 24. 
http://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=US2012412450.
MacIsaac, Norman, and Abu N. M. Wahid. 1993. “The Grameen Bank: Its Institutional 
Lessons for Rural Financing.” In The Grameen Bank: Poverty Relief in 
Bangladesh, ed. Abu N. M Wahid. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 191–207.
Marsh, Christopher. 2000. “Social Capital and Democracy in Russia.” Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 33(2): 183–99.
Mason, Andrew D., and Elizabeth M. King. 2001. Engendering Development: Through 
Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/01/891686/engendering-
development-through-gender-equality-rights-resources-voice.
Mayoux, Linda. 1995. From Vicious to Virtuous Circles? Gender and Micro-Enterprise 
Development. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development. http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/
(httpPublications)/5901781754E7C91580256B67005B6AF7?OpenDocument.
———. 2001. “Tackling the Down Side: Social Capital, Women’s Empowerment and 
Micro-Finance in Cameroon.” Development and Change 32(3): 435–64.
———. 2005. “Women’s Empowerment Through Sustainable Micro-Finance: 
Rethinking ‘Best Practice.’” Unpublished Manuscript. 
http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/iarc/ediais/pdf/WomensEmpowermentt
hroughSustainableMicrofinance.pdf.
94
Minkoff, Debra C. 1997. “Producing Social Capital: National Social Movements and 
Civil Society.” American Behavioral Scientist 40(5): 606–19.
Misztal, Barbara A. 1996. Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social 
Order. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press.
MkNelly, Barbara, and Mona McCord. 2001. Women’s Empowerment. Freedom from 
Hunger. 
https://bhl.bz/sites/default/files/Womens_Empowerment_Impact_Review_10-01-
eng.pdf.
Moghadam, Valentine M. 2004. “The Gender of Democracy: The Link Between 
Women’s Rights and Democratization in the Middle East.” Arab Reform Bulletin 
2(7): 2–3.
Mondal, Wali I., and Ruth Anne Tune. 1993. “Replicating the Grameen Bank in North 
America: The Good Faith Fund Experience.” In The Grameen Bank: Poverty 
Relief in Bangladesh, ed. Abu N. M Wahid. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 223–
34.
Morduch, Jonathan. 1999a. “The Microfinance Promise.” Journal of Economic 
Literature 37(4): 1569–1614.
———. 1999b. “The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence from the Grameen 
Bank.” Journal of Development Economics 60(1): 229–48.
———. 1999c. “The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence from the Grameen 
Bank.” Journal of Development Economics 60(1): 229–48.
Mosley, Paul, Daniela Olejarova, and Elena Alexeeva. 2004. “Microfinance, Social 
Capital Formation and Political Development in Russia and Eastern Europe: A 
Pilot Study of Programmes in Russia, Slovakia and Romania.” Journal of 
International Development 16(3): 407–27.
Muller, Edward N. 1988. “Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality.” 
American Sociological Review 53(1): 50–68.
———. 1995. “Economic Determinants of Democracy.” American Sociological Review 
60(6): 966–82.
Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1994. “Civic Culture and Democracy: The 
Question of Causal Relationships.” American Political Science Review 88(03): 
635–52.
Munkler, Herfried. 2006. “Civil Society: Desperate Wishful Thinking?” In Civil Society: 
Berlin Perspectives, ed. John H Keane. New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 91–102.
95
Nagarajan, Geetha, and Michael McNulty. 2004. Environmental Preconditions for 
Successful: Post-Conflict Microfinance. Washington, DC: Accelerated 
Microenterprise Advancement Project, United States Agency for International 
Development. Microenterprise Best Practices Brief 4. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnade302.pdf (May 18, 2014).
Narayan, Paresh Kumar, Seema Narayan, and Russell Smyth. 2007. Does Democracy 
Facilitate Economic Growth or Does Economic Growth Facilitate Democracy? 
An Empirical Study of Sub-Saharan Africa. Victoria, Australia: Department of 
Economics, Monash University. Discussion Paper 10/07. 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/mos/moswps/2007-10.html.
———. 2011. “Does Democracy Facilitate Economic Growth or Does Economic Growth
Facilitate Democracy? An Empirical Study of Sub-Saharan Africa.” Economic 
Modelling 28(3): 900–910.
Nelson, Candace. 2013. “Community-Based Providers.” In The New Microfinance 
Handbook: A Financial Market System Perspective, ed. Joanna Ledgerwood. 
Washington, DC: World Bank, 149–70. 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/book/9780821389270.
Neubauer, Deane E. 1967. “Some Conditions of Democracy.” The American Political 
Science Review 61(4): 1002–9.
Newton, Kenneth. 1997. “Social Capital and Democracy.” American Behavioral Scientist
40(5): 575–86.
Nidhiya, Menon. 2003. “Consumption Smoothing in Micro-Credit Programs.” 
Unpublished Manuscript. 
http://128.118.178.162/eps/dev/papers/0403/0403005.pdf.
Nordlinger, Eric A. 1977. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
O’Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. “Why the Rule of Law Matters.” Journal of Democracy 
15(4): 32–46.
Olsen, Marvin E. 1968. “Multivariate Analysis of National Political Development.” 
American Sociological Review 33(5): 699–712.
Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political 
Science Review 87(3): 567–76.
Onwuegbuzie, Anthony J., Nancy L. Leech, and Kathleen M. T. Collins. 2012. 
“Qualitative Analysis Techniques for the Review of the Literature.” Qualitative 
Report 17: 1–28.
96
Ossewaarde, Marinus R. R. 2006. “Citizenship in Civil Society?” Journal of Civil Society
2(3): 199–215.
Parker, Joan, and Geetha Nagarajan. 2000. Can Microfinance Meet the Poor’s Financial 
Needs in Times of Natural Disaster?. Bethesda, MD: Office of Microenterprise 
Development, Bureau for Global Programs, Center for Economic Growth and 
Agricultural Development, U.S. Agency for International Development. 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/template.rc/1.9.27806/.
Pickering, Kathleen, and David W. Mushinski. 2001. “Cultural Aspects of Credit 
Institutions: Transplanting the Grameen Bank Credit Group Structure to the Pine 
Ridge Indian Reservation.” Journal of Economic Issues 35(2): 459–67.
Pitt, Mark. 1999. Reply to Jonathan Morduch’s “Does Microfinance Really Help the 
Poor? New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh.” Brown University.
http://www.brown.edu/research/projects/pitt/sites/brown.edu.research.projects.pitt
/files/uploads/reply_0.pdf.
Pitt, Mark M., and Shahidur R. Khandker. 1998. “The Impact of Group-Based Credit 
Programs on Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants 
Matter?” Journal of Political Economy 106(5): 958–96.
Pitt, Mark M., Shahidur R. Khandker, and Jennifer Cartwright. 2003. Does Micro-Credit 
Empower Women? Evidence from Bangladesh. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Policy Research Working Paper 2998. 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2998.
Pitt, Mark M., Shahidur R. Khandker, Omar Haider Chowdhury, and Daniel L. Millimet. 
2003. “Credit Programs for the Poor and the Health Status of Children in Rural 
Bangladesh.” International Economic Review 44(1): 87–118.
PLAN International. Mid-Term Evaluation of the Plan/Nirdhan Capacity Building 
Project in Nepal. Working, United Kingdom: Promoting Child Rights to End 
Child Poverty, International. http://www.devjobsmail.com/private/cpadocs/past-
reports/evaluation-pncbp-nepal.pdf.
Portes, Alejandro. 1998. “Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern 
Sociology.” Annual Review of Sociology 24(1): 1–24.
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. “The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life.” 
The American Prospect 4(13): 35–42.
———. 1995. “Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in 
America.” Political Science and Politics 28(4): 664–83.
———. 2001. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New 
York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
97
Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. 1993. Making Democracy 
Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Quinones, Benjamin R., Jr., and Hans Dieter Seibel. 2000. “Social Capital in 
Microfinance: Case Studies in the Philippines.” Policy Sciences 33(3/4): 421–33.
Rahman, Atiur. 1996. “Rural Development from Below: Lessons Learned from Grameen 
Bank Experience in Bangladesh.” Journal of Socio-Economics 25(2): 189–223.
Rahman, Atiur, and Baban Hasnat. 1993. “Housing for the Rural Poor: The Grameen 
Bank Experience.” In The Grameen Bank: Poverty Relief in Bangladesh, ed. Abu 
N. M Wahid. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 69–95.
Rahman, Atiur, and M. Mahabub-ul Islam. 1993. “The General Performance of the 
Grameen Bank.” In The Grameen Bank: Poverty Relief in Bangladesh, ed. Abu N.
M Wahid. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 49–67.
Rahman, Atiur, and Abdur Razzaque. 2000. “On Reaching the Hardcore Poor: Some 
Evidence on Social Exclusion in NGO Programmes.” The Bangladesh 
Development Studies 26(1): 1–35.
Rahman, Atiur, and Abdus Samad. 1993. “The Loan Recovery Performance of the 
Grameen Bank.” In The Grameen Bank: Poverty Relief in Bangladesh, ed. Abu N.
M Wahid. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 175–90.
Rahman, Atiur, Abu N. M. Wahid, and Faizul Islam. 1993. “Impact of Grameen Bank on 
the Nutritional Status of the Rural Poor.” In The Grameen Bank: Poverty Relief in
Bangladesh, ed. Abu N. M Wahid. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 97–126.
Rai, Ashok S., and Tomas Sjöström. n.d. “Efficient Lending in Village Economies.” 
Unpublished Manuscript. http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2000-
OiA/pdfpapers/rai.pdf.
———. 2004. “Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in 
Village Economies.” The Review of Economic Studies 71(1): 217–34.
Rankin, Katharine N. 2001. “Governing Development: Neoliberalism, Microcredit, and 
Rational Economic Woman.” Economy and Society 30(1): 18–37.
Reddy, C. S., and Sandeep Manak. 2005. Self-Help Groups: A Keystone of Microfinance 
in India: Women Empowerment and Social Security. Hyderabad, India: Andhra 
Pradesh Mahila Abhivruddhi Society. 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.31147/Self-Help
%20Groups_A%20Keystone%20of%20Microfinance%20in%20India_Women
%20empowerment%20%20social%20security.pdf.
98
Ritchie, Jane. 2003. “The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research.” In 
Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and 
Researchers, eds. Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 24–46.
Rizzo, Helen, Abdel-Hamid Abdel-Latif, and Katherine Meyer. 2007. “The Relationship 
Between Gender Equality and Democracy: A Comparison of Arab Versus Non-
Arab Muslim Societies.” Sociology 41(6): 1151–70.
Robinson, Marguerite S. 2005. “Commercial Microfinance: Past, Present and Future.” In 
The Democratisation of Finance: Future Directions for Microfinance, eds. 
Ranjula Bali Swain and Emilia Liljefrost. Uppsala, Sweden: The Collegium for 
Development Studies Uppsala University, 5–11. 
http://www.kus.uu.se/en/publications/outlook_development/3_1_25.shtml.
Rosenberg, Richard, Adrian Gonzalez, and Sushma Narain. 2009. “The New 
Moneylenders: Are the Poor Being Exploited by High Microcredit Interest 
Rates?” In Moving Beyond Storytelling: Emerging Research in Microfinance, eds.
Todd A. Watkins and Karen Hicks. Bingley, United Kingdom: Emerald, 145–81.
Rouf, Kazi Abdur. 2011a. “Citizenship Learning, Participatory Democracy and Micro-
Financing: The Case of Grameen Bank’s Peer-Lending System in Bangladesh.” 
Journal of Global Citizenship and Equity Education 1(1): 124–47.
———. 2011b. “Grameen Bank Women Borrowers’ Familial and Community 
Relationships Development in Patriarchal Bangladesh.” International Journal of 
Research Studies in Psychology 1(1): 17–26.
———. 2011c. “The Impact of the Grameen Bank upon the Patriarchal Family and 
Community Relations of Women Borrowers in Bangladesh.” Ph.D. Dissertation. 
University of Toronto.
———. 2012. “A Feminist Interpretation of Grameen Bank Sixteen Decisions 
Campaign.” Humanomics 28(4): 285–96.
Rutherford, Stuart, Md Maniruzzaman, and S. K. Sinha. 2004. Grameen II, at the End of 
2003: A “Grounded View” of How Grameen’s New Initiative Is Progressing in the
Villages. Dhaka, Bangladesh: MicroSave. 
http://www.microsave.net/resource/grameen_ii_at_the_end_of_2003_a_grounded
_view_of_how_grameen_s_new_initiative_is_progressing_in_the_villages#.U1rE
SfldV8E.
Sanyal, Paromita. 2009. “From Credit to Collective Action: The Role of Microfinance in 
Promoting Women’s Social Capital and Normative Influence.” American 
Sociological Review 74(4): 529–50.
Schmitter, Philippe C., and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. “What Democracy Is and Is Not.” 
Journal of Democracy 2(3): 75–88.
99
Schugurensky, Daniel. 2004. “Participatory Budget: A Tool for Democratizing 
Democracy.” Presented at the Some Assembly Required: Participatory Budgeting 
in Canada and Abroad, held by Catalyst Centre, Toronto, Canada.
Schuler, Sidney Ruth, Syed M. Hashemi, Ann P. Riley, and Shireen Akhter. 1996. “Credit 
Programs, Patriarchy and Men’s Violence Against Women in Rural Bangladesh.” 
Social Science and Medicine 43(12): 1729–42.
Schurmann, Anna T., and Heidi Bart Johnston. 2009. “The Group-Lending Model and 
Social Closure: Microcredit, Exclusion, and Health in Bangladesh.” Journal of 
Health, Population, and Nutrition 27(4): 518–27.
Seibel, Hans Dieter, and Dolores Torres. 1999. “Are Grameen Replications Sustainable, 
and Do They Reach the Poor? The Case of CARD Rural Bank in the Philippines.”
Journal of Microfinance (ESR Review) 1(1): 117–30.
Sen, Amartya. 1987. Gender and Cooperative Conflicts. World Institute for Development
Economics Research Helsinki. Working papers 18. 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/previous/en_GB/wp-
18/_files/82530817554384479/default/WP18.pdf.
Sen, Amartya Kumar. 1999. “Democracy as a Universal Value.” Journal of Democracy 
10(3): 3–17.
Servon, Lisa J. 1992. “Microcredit in the U.S.: An Alternative Economic Survival 
Strategy.” Berkeley Planning Journal 7(1): 148–56.
Shahidur R. Khandker. 1998. Fighting Poverty with Microcredit: Experience in 
Bangladesh. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Sharma, Shalendra D. 2007. “Democracy, Good Governance, and Economic 
Development.” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 3(1): 29–62.
Shearing, Clifford D., and Philip C. Stenning. 1983. “Private Security: Implications for 
Social Control.” Social Problems 30(5): 493–506.
Shetty, Naveen K. 2008. “Microfinance for Micro Enterprise Development: An Inquiry 
for a New Paradigm.” IUP Journal of Financial Economics 6(1): 88–98.
Shetty, Sujata. 2010. “Microcredit, Poverty, and Empowerment: Exploring the 
Connections.” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 9(3): 356–
91.
Shils, Edward. 1991. “The Virtue of Civil Society.” Government and Opposition 26(1): 
3–20.
100
Shrestha, Milan. 1999. Self-Help Banking Program and Women’s Empowerment: A Rapid
Assessment. Kathmandu, Nepal: Center for Self-help Development. 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/258245903_Self-
Help_Banking_Program_and_Women’s_Empowerment_A_Rapid_Assessment.
Simmel, Georg. 1950. The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York, NY: The Free Press.
Smith, Arthur K. 1969. “Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A 
Causal Analysis.” Midwest Journal of Political Science 13(1): 95–125.
Smolar, Aleksander. 1996. “From Opposition to Atomization: Civil Society After 
Communism.” Journal of Democracy 7(1): 24–38.
Stanley, William Deane. 1996. The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military 
Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University 
Press.
Stone, Deborah A. 2002. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. New 
York, NY: Norton.
Sven, Reichardt. 2006. “Civility, Violence and Civil Society.” In Civil Society: Berlin 
Perspectives, ed. John H Keane. New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 139–67.
De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1898. 2 vols. Democracy in America. New York, NY: The 
Century. https://archive.org/details/democracyinamer00gilmgoog.
Todd, Helen. 1996. Women at the Center: Grameen Bank Borrowers after One Decade. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Tyler, Tom R. 1999. “Why People Cooperate with Organizations: An Identity-Based 
Perspective.” In Research in Organizational Behavior: An Annual Series of 
Analytical Essays and Critical Reviews. Vol. 21, eds. Barry M Staw and Larry L 
Cummings. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 201–46.
United Nations. 1981. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women. A/CONF/177/7. 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm.
———. 1995. Beijing Declaration. 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf.
———. 2005. 2005 World Summit Outcome. A/60/L.1. 
http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf.
———. 2006. Observance of the International Year of Microcredit. . Report of the 
Secretary-General A/61/307. 
http://www.un.org/ga/61/second/item57summary.shtml.
101
———. 2007. Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to 
Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies. A/RES/62/7. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/62/7.
———. 2013. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013. Washington, DC: 
United Nations Publications.
———. “International Year of Microcredit 2005.” 
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/microcredit_2005/index.htm.
United States Agency for International Development. 1995. Grameen Bank’s Sixteen 
Decisions. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development.
Microenterprise Development Brief 33. 
http://www.spanish.microfinancegateway.org/files/1523_1523.pdf.
Velasco, Carmen, and Reynaldo Marconi. 2004. “Group Dynamics, Gender and 
Microfinance in Bolivia.” Journal of International Development 16(3): 519–28.
Vigenina, Denotes, and Alexander S. Kritikos. 2004. “The Individual Micro-Lending 
Contract: Is It a Better Design than Joint-Liability? Evidence from Georgia.” 
Economic Systems 28(2): 155–76.
Vinelli, Andres G. 2002. “Financial Sustainability in U.S. Microfinance Organizations: 
Lessons from Developing Countries.” In Replicating Microfinance in the United 
States, eds. James H. Carr and Zhong-Yi Tong. Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 137–65.
Wagner, Charlotte. 2012. “From Boom to Bust: How Different Has Microfinance Been 
from Traditional Banking?” Development Policy Review 30(2): 187–210.
Wagner, John A. 1995. “Studies of Individualism-Collectivism: Effects on Cooperation in
Groups.” Academy of Management Journal 38(1): 152–73.
Wahid, Abu N. M. 1993. “The Growth and Progress of the Grameen Bank.” In The 
Grameen Bank: Poverty Relief in Bangladesh, ed. Abu N. M Wahid. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 33–48.
Walzer, Michael. 1991. “The Civil Society Argument.” Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 94(1): 
1–11.
———. 2011. “On Humanitarianism: Is Helping Others Charity, or Duty, or Both?” 
Foreign Affairs 90(4): 69–80.
Weber, Heloise. 2001. The Imposition of a Global Development Architecture: The 
Example of Microcredit. Coventry, United Kingdom: Centre for the Study of 
Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick. CSGR Working Paper 
77/01.
102
———. 2002. “The Imposition of a Global Development Architecture: The Example of 
Microcredit.” Review of International Studies 28(03): 537–55.
Whiteley, Paul F. 2000. “Economic Growth and Social Capital.” Political Studies 48(3): 
443–66.
White, Sarah C. 1991. Evaluating the Impact of NGOs in Rural Poverty Alleviation: 
Bangladesh Country Study. London, United Kingdom: Overseas Development 
Institute. Working Paper 50. 
http://www.cabdirect.org/abstracts/19926714133.html;jsessionid=4D207527ECC
CE003E419ADD51D69E85C.
Wickrama, K. A. S., and Charles L. Mulford. 1996. “Political Democracy, Economic 
Development, Disarticulation, and Social Well-Being in Developing Countries.” 
Sociological Quarterly 37(3): 375–90.
Williams, Bernard. 1988. “Formal Structures and Social Reality.” In Trust: Making and 
Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. Diego Gambetta. New York, NY: Basil 
Blackwell, 3–13.
Woller, Gary M., Christopher Dunford, and Warner Woodworth. 1999. “Where to 
Microfinance.” International Journal of Economic Development 1(1): 29–64.
Woolcock, Michael J. V. 1998a. “Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a 
Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework.” Theory and Society 27(2): 151–
208.
———. 1998b. “Social Theory, Development Policy, and Poverty Alleviation: A 
Comparative-Historical Analysis of Group-Based Banking in Developing 
Economies.” Ph.D. Dissertation. Brown University.
Working Women’s Forum. 2000. Social Platform Through Social Innovations: A 
Coalition with Women in the Informal Sector. Chennai, India: Working Women’s 
Forum.
World Bank. 1999. World Development Report: Knowledge for Development. Oxford, 
United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
———. “What Is Social Capital.” 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVEL
OPMENT/EXTTSOCIALCAPITAL/0,,contentMDK:20185164~menuPK:418217
~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html.
Yunus, Muhammad. 1998. “Poverty Alleviation: Is Economics Any Help? Lessons from 
the Grameen Bank Experience.” Journal of International Affairs 52(1): 47–66.
103
———. 2002. “Women’s Empowerment, Microcredit, IT and Poverty.” Grameen 
Dialogue 52. http://www.grameen-
info.org/dialogue/dialogue52/specialfeature.html.
———. 2008. Each of You Have the Power to Change the World. Boston, MA: 
Commencement Speech at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
http://newsoffice.mit.edu/2008/yunus-0606.
———. 2013. “Grameen Bank II.” http://www.grameen.com/index2.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=30&pop=1&page=0&Itemid=764.
Yunus, Muhammad, and Alan Jolis. 2003. Banker to the Poor: Micro-Lending and the 
Battle Against World Poverty. New York, NY: Public Affairs.
104
Curriculum Vitae
Pei-Shi Lin
Education
Master of Arts in Political Science
Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis
(Majored in Political Theory). …..........................................................2012/01~2016/08
Master of Social Science in Political Science
National Sun Yat-Sen University
(Majored in Political Theory and Philosophy). .....................................2001/09~2004/06
Bachelor of Art in Journalism
Shih Hsin University
(Majored in International Communication)...........................................1996/09~2001/06
Fellowship
Fellowship
Graduate Institute of Political Science,
National Sun Yat-Sen University...............................................................................2001
Presentation
KI Eco Center (www.kiecocenter.org)
“Hatred, Fear, and Recklessness: A Brief History of Modern
Taiwan and the Sunflower Student Movement”..............................................2014/04/09
